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AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF Yuko Nagatomo for the 
Master of Arts in Speech Communication presented May 2, 1988. 
Title: Intercultural Factors in Business Negotiation be-
tween Japanese and Americans. 
APPROVED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE THESIS COMMITTEE: 
This thesis is a review of relevant literature on busi-
ness negotiation between Japanese and American and an analy-
sis of cultural differences in negotiation from an inter-
cultural perspective. The following four key issues are 
explored and analyzed with intercultural communication con-
cepts: 
1) major differences in approaches to the process of 
business negotiation between the United States and 
Japan; 
2) potential friction between Japanese and Americans in 
business negotiation that is attributable to Japanese 
and American cultural differences; 
3) the applicability and usefulness of an intercultural 
perspective in enhancing business negotiation skills; 
and 
4) main factors affecting the use of an intercultural 
perspective in cross-cultural business negotiation 
and the degree to which they are manifested in the 
u.s.-Japan business negotiations. 
The review of the relevant literature on Japanese and 
American business negotiation showed that despite the con-
sistency of stages in the negotiation process between the 
two cultural groups, the content and duration of each stage 
differs substantially between cultures. The differences 
and their consequences, including potential friction be-
tween the two groups are attributed to cultural differences 
in assumptions and values orientations, in philosophies of 
negotiating, in communication styles, in decision-making 
processes, and in situational constraints and status re-
lationships. 
Culture is operationally defined as subjective cul-
ture, i.e., human cognitive and perceptual processes 
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either in the individual sense or in the collective sense. 
Thus, employment of an intercultural perspective is assumed 
as an indispensable prerequisite for effective human commu-
nication of any sort to take place. Thereby, in this study 
negotiation is also operationally defined as a process of 
cultural synergy between two (or more) differing entities. 
The applicability and usefulness of an intercultural per-
spective in business negotiation is discussed in terms of 
the assumption of perceptual variance and synergistic 
conflict resolution. 
The thesis includes an examination of the impact of 
situational constraints upon cultural adaptability. The 
basic assumption is that motives to cooperate and power re-
lations between parties tend to dictate who accommodates 
behavior more, thus who is more willing to use an inter-
cultural perspective in cross-cultural business negotiation. 
A review of the relevant literature on U.S.-Japan business 
negotiation case studies suggested that the greater a 
party's motives and stakes are in conflict, the more cul-
turally accommodating a party becomes. The successful 
U.S.-Japan business negotiation case studies also exemplify 
the emergence of cultural synergy through strong commit-
ment to collaboration on the part of both sides. 
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The essential difference between international and 
domestic business negotiations is that international nego-
tiation encompasses a wide diversity of environments of 
the countries involved. The effective strategies and 
tactics of international business negotiation, therefore, 
requires a great degree of modification of perspective and 
an understanding of the characteristics of the particular 
foreign environment in which negotiation takes place (Kapoor, 
1975, pp. 1-3). However, when individuals enter a foreign 
environment, what is most likely to happen is that they use 
a "self-reference criterion -- the unconscious reference to 
one's own cultural values" in judging situations in the new 
environment (Lee, 1966; Hays et al., 1972; Kapoor, 1975). 
This is where one of the basic difficulties in international 
business negotiation lies. A part of the purposes of this 
study is to make cultural values more visible, thus adding 
cultural awareness to international business negotiation. 
One of the reasons why culture is not taken into account 
is because of a "convergence hypothesis." The notion of a 
"convergence hypothesis" claims that "'the logic of in-
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dustrialism' inevitably leads to a convergence which cuts 
through and undermines 'tradition' irrespective of the main 
features of culture, history and values with which the in-
dustrializing society began" (Karsh and Cole, 1968, pp. 46-
47). No doubt there is a certain connection (but not corre-
lation) between the superstructure (social change) and the 
substructure (technology). Yet as many studies on the 
Japanese managerial system indicate, despite the rapid 
Westernization of technological aspects of Japanese in-
dustries Japan still remains within a non-Western socio-
cultural context. Japanese society is changing and will 
continue to change. However, it does not necessarily imply 
that convergence of the Japanese and Western social struc-
tures (not their social organizations but their fundamen-
tals) is actually occurring or could be possible over time 
(Agegglen, 1958, Nakane, 1970; Dore, 1973; Peterson and 
Schwind, 1977). Pascale and Maguire's (1978, 1980) studies, 
for example, provide more support for "sociology of organ-
izations/convergence'' argument than for ''cultural diversity." 
Yet those data are not necessarily suggestive of conver-
gence in their fundamentals. The argument on the "conver-
gence" is beyond the scope of this study. But this study 
takes the view that at least at the present time the two 
highly industrialized societies are still described as 
mirror images of one another, even though a number of simi-
larities may be reflected on the surface. 
Needless to say, culture is not the sole determinant 
of negotiating behavior. For instance, rapid changes in in-
ternational political and economic situations do contribute 
to a shift in the bargaining strengths of the parties. 
Negotiation is dynamic and multidimensional, and subject 
to various environmental conditions as well as such factors 
as issues, events, expertise, and personalities. Hence, 
although culture is a (not the) factor underlying and 
surrounding the negotiation process, given the quite dis-
similar cultural contexts in the United States and Japan, 
the success or failure of the business negotiation 
between the two groups would be influenced to a great ex-
tent by the degree of their understanding of the fundamen-
tal cultural differences underlying their approaches to 
the negotiation process. This study adds to that under-
standing. 
RATIONAL 
The literature focusing on doing business with the 
Japanese has yielded numerous books and articles of an anal-
ysis of basic differences in philosophies, values, history, 
economy, politics, and so on. Few studies can be found 
that synthesize the situations using intercultural concepts. 
The basic assumption underlying this study is that the 
application of intercultural communication principles pro-
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vides an analytical framework according to which the act of 
intercultural business negotiation can be examined, analy-
zed, and discussed, and that the awareness of its implica-
tions helps international business negotiators better pre-
pare for and cope with their problems. 
The goal common to all negotiations is the satisfaction 
of needs. We negotiate to fulfill our needs and resolve 
our differences in interests. However, we differ in cogni-
tion, affection, and behavior and we all have our own 
unique ways of perceiving and creating reality. If culture 
is defined as a process of reality construction, "each of 
us is culture in himself or herself" (Casse and Deol, 1985, 
xii). All human interactions are intercultural by defini-
tion. The basic stance of this study, therefore, is to 
view all negotiations as culturally loaded. (Culture, in 
its broadest sense, may be himself/herself, male/female, 
parent/child, husband/wife, superior/subordinate, or manage-
ment/labor and so on.) 
Hence, if all negotiations are seen as intercultural 
encounters, it seems reasonable to assume that employment 
of an intercultural communication perspective is not only 
a useful tool for effective communication in cross-cul-
tural negotiation but is perhaps a basis for learning some 
of the skills and strategies necessary for the success of 
negotiation of any sort. This study, however, is not in-
tended to verify that employment of an intercultural per-
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spective is a panacea for all the ills that may arise in 
American and Japanese business negotiations. Rather, it 
is an exploration of the applicability and usefulness of 
an intercultural communication perspective in providing a 
direction of improvement in communication and negotiation 
skills. 
There are two factors that have intentionally limi-
ted the scape of this study. One is the fact that inter-
cul tural communication is a product of an American frame 
of reference (Hoopes, 1979, pp. 10-13). Thus, only 
American sources will be consulted for explicating the 
analytical frame. The second factor is that little 
Japanese literature on approaches to negotiation is avail-
able in the United States. Thus, the purpose of this 
study is limited to considering possible intercultural 
factors in business negotiation models that have been 
constructed by Americans. While it would certainly be 
of interest to also consider purely Japanese models, it 
is assumed here that both Japanese and American readers 
will benefit from considering the impact of culture on 
the negotiation approaches commonly used by Americans. 
PURPOSES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
5 
The ultimate goal of this study is to discuss the extent 
to which an awareness of an intercultural perspective could 
contribute to the development of both American and Japanese 
business people's negotiating skills in dealing with one 
another. Basically, the nature of the study is congruent 
with two major distinctive characteristics of international 
management: "adjustment of strategy to varied environmental 
conditions and behavioral sensitivity and adaptability" 
(Fayerweather and Kapoor, 1974, p. 19). This study is in-
tended to serve both as a literature review and as an essay 
on business negotiations between the United States and Japan 
from an intercultural perspective. The research questions 
to be asked, therefore, include the following: 
1. What are the major differences in the process of 
business negotiation between the United States and 
Japan? (Chapter II) 
The question includes 1 ) defining the four stages of 
business negotiation and 2) identifying major 
discrepancies in Japanese and American business 
negotiating styles. 
2. What are the major problems confronted by American 
businessmen negotiating with the Japanese that are 
attributable to Japanese and American cultural differ-
ences? (Chapter III) 
This question is concerned with potential friction be-
tween Americans and Japanese in business negotiation 
arising from the cultural differences. (However, it 
will not inquire specifically into conflict resolu-
tion.) The main concern is with cultural sensitivity 
6 
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that affects the negotiation process. The question will 
be construed in terms of cultural differences in 1) 
assumptions and values, 2) philosophies of negotiating, 
3) communication styles, 4) decision-making processes, 
and 5) situational constraints and status relationships. 
However, much weight in the literature review will be 
given to exploration of the nature and characteristics 
of the Japanese value system that regulates the nego-
tiating behavior of the Japanese, thereby affecting the 
strategies of the Americans. 
3. What are some relevant intercultural communication 
principles, and what is the applicability and useful-
ness of an intercultural perspective in enhancing 
business negotiating skills? (Chapter IV) 
To answer this question, first certain principles of 
intercultural communication will be defined and analy-
zed in terms of their implications for culture-biased 
communication problems. They are: 1) awareness of 
cultural contrast, 2) empathy, and 3) ethnorelativism. 
Then the applicability and usefulness of an intercul-
tural perspective in negotiating skills will be dis-
cussed regarding 1) perceptual variance and 2) 
synergistic conflict resolution. 
4. What are the main factors affecting the use of an in-
tercultural perspective in cross-cultural business 
negotiation, and how are they manifested in the U.S.-
Japan business negotiations? (Chapter V) The dis-
cussion of this question will center around two inter-
related factors -- motives and power relations between 
parties and their impact on the degree of the parties' 
cultural accommodation. Two U.S.-Japan business nego-
tiation case studies will be reviewed in opposite con-
texts. Finally with the qualification of the term 
"accommodating," cultural accommodation as negotiating 
power will be addressed. 
In the final chapter after brief clarification of the 
main points of the previous chapters, the future of cultural 
awareness in business and negotiation will be discussed. 
The discussion will be based on a review of the research on 
U.S managerial perceptions of intenational expertise by 
Kobrin (1984). While the study in question is concerned 
with U.S. firms only ("Fortune 500" industrial firms), its 
data have enough applicability and generalizability to 
address the issue of the importance of cultural awareness 
and cultural training for prospective business leaders of 
both the United States and Japan. Thus, exploring this 
issue will be expected to serve to sum up the underlying 
purposes and efforts of this study. 
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CHAPTER II 
CROSS-CULTURAL BUSINESS NEGOTIATION 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter serves as an introduction to this study, 
in particular to the subseQuent chapter. It concerns itself 
mainly with clarifying the scope of this study through an 
overview of the literature on negotiation and a brief 
summary of the relevant literature on cross-cultural busi-
ness negotiation. 
The literature review in this chapter consists of four 
major sections: 1) the literature on negotiation, 2) 
definitions of negotiation, 3) major problems in cross-
cultural negotiation, and 4) the process of business 
negotiation. The final section will address the issues 
concerning the different approaches to the process of 
business negotiation in the United States and Japan 
(research Question #1). 
1 0 
THE LITERATURE OF NEGOTIATION 
A Schism Between Institutional and Empirical Literature 
The literature on negotiation falls into two catego-
ries -- the institutional literature in industrial relations 
by professional negotiators and the experimental or theo-
retical literature by negotiation scholars. There is a 
large schism between the two approaches to the subject 
(Stevens, 1963, xi-xii; Zartman, 1976, p. 6; Strauss, 1978, 
pp. 7-11; Rubin, 1985, p. 5). The institutional literature 
is essentially descriptive accounts of the encounter and 
"there have been very few studies of real-life encounters 
that use or test notions derived from theoretical or 
experimental studies" (Zartman, 1976, p. 6). On the other 
hand, the theoretical or experimental literature, much of 
which utilizes game theory paradigms, has rarely reached 
to the outer world in search of real bargaining incidents 
(Rubin and Brown, 1975, p. 298). To put it in Zartman's 
words, "the first is often uninteresting to the scholar, 
and the second is incomprehensible to the negotiator." 
The large communication gap between those who practice 
negotiation and those who study it has hindered a 
comprehensive understanding of the bargaining process. 
Zartman (1976, pp. 20-32) suggests a useful framework 
for studying negotiation by categorizing seven schools, 
where "each explains outcomes in terms of a different 
variable and each has something to tell both the observer 
and the practitioner, although it must be said that the 
line between any two schools is not always very sharp." 
The seven schools are: 
1. Historical description, explaining a given out-
come through a particular set of ingredients or 
through one unique element. 
2. Contextual, which sees outcomes determined by a 
particular phaseological interpretation of his-
tory, referring either to the history of the 
negotiation itself or to the larger phase of 
history into which it fits. 
3. Structural, finding its explanation of outcomes 
in patterns of relationships between parties or 
their goals. 
4. Strategic, focusing on the element of choice, as 
determined by the structure of the values at 
stake and also by the other party's patterns of 
selection. 
5. Personality types to explain outcomes, combining 
some of the insights of the structualists with 
those of the behavioralists in the search for a 
single key to negotiation. 
6. Behavioral skills, explaining the impact of speci-
fic behavioral traits on negotiation process and 
outcome. 
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7. Process, looking at negotiation as a challenge-and-
response encounter in which the moves are the 
inputs, and negotiating is a learning process. 
Parties use their bids both to respond to the pre-
vious counter offer and to influence the next one; 
the offers themselves become an exercise in power. 
1 2 
Zartman claims that none of those approaches alone pro-
vides a comprehensive explanation of the negotiation process 
because "negotiation is a complex process, with many of its 
complexities still unexplored." 
Cross-Cultural Business Negotiation 
The business literature that deals exclusively with 
cross-cultural negotiation is sparse. As Graham (1983) 
points out, "a few have appeared in business journals (Van 
Zandt 1970; Jastram 1974; Kapoor 1974; and Wells 1977), 
but they are primarily descriptive and often anecdotal 
in nature. No confirmation of findings has been reported 
and occasionally opposing prescriptions have been suggested" 
(p. 47). Due to the surge of interest in Japanese manage-
ment techniques numerous ''doing-business-with-the-Japanese" 
works have appeared in the past several years. But again, 
they are centered around prescriptive advice and tend not 
to be grounded in research or testable theory. Graham's 
(1983) empirical research on the determinants of the out-
comes of business negotiation in three cultures -- Japan, 
Brazil, and the United States deserves close attention as 
a rare exception to the rule. (The study was designed to 
simulate the essential elements of the actual negotiations 
observed in his preliminary field work.) 
This paper is not intended either to bridge the afore-
mentioned schism between the two approaches to the nego-
tiation process (institutional and empirical) or to 
develop a theoretical model of cross-cultural business 
negotiation. As already mentioned, the study of negotia-
tion encompasses various theories and practices. When a 
cultural dimension is added to this broad terrain, the 
complexities of the issues are further compounded. With 
this in mind, the issue of cross-cultural negotiation in 
this study is tackled from a different perspective, by 
looking at U.S.- Japan business negotiation as a process 
of cultural synergy between two entities. The main focus, 
therefore, will be on 1) identifying some of the psycho-
and-socio-cultural factors underlying the negotiating 
behavior of the two cultural groups, with particular 
emphasis on those of the Japanese, and ultimately on 
2) exploring the applicability and usefulness of inter-
cultural communication principles in enhancing cross-
cultural negotiation skills. 
NEGOTIATION DEFINED 
Definitions 
Negotiation has been defined in various ways. In its 
general sense, negotiation can be defined as "the settle-
ment of differences and waging of conflict through verbal 
exchange" (Rubin, 1985, p. 5). It can be considered as 
one of the basic processes of decision making among parties 
concerning the selection of a single value out of many 
13 
(Zartman, 1976, p.7). It is also viewed as a "mixed motive 
game": the ambivalence of a player's relation to the other 
player, the mixture of mutual dependence and conflict, of 
partnership and competition (Schelling, 1963, p. 89). Yet 
most of the definitions contain common components and some 
of the basic characteristics of the negotiation process are 
summarized by Ways (1985, p. 20) as follows: "Negotiation 
is a process in which two or more parties, who have both 
common interests and conflicting interests, put forth and 
discuss explicit proposals concerning specific terms of a 
possible agreement." More specifically, this definition 
involves two crucial factors: 
1. The existence of "common interests" and 
"conflicting interests." Unless both are 
present, in either an overt or a latent 
way, negotiation makes no sense. 
2. The specificity of agreements are not in-
tended to abolish all conflict between the 
parties. Negotiated accords work best when 
their substance is quite limited and clearly 
defined. (Ways, 1985, p. 20) 
The Context of Negotiation 
For purposes of this study the analysis of the con-
text of negotiation suggested by Kapoor (1975) is useful 
in looking at negotiation in relation to the larger struc-
tural context within which negotiation occurs. Kapoor 
argues that the nature of negotiation includes the follow-
ing dimensions as shown in Figure 1. 
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Thus: 
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Figure 1. The context of negotiation. 
Source: Kapoor, 1975, p. 2. 
1 . Negotiation is typically characterized by 
four Cs which represent common interests 
(something to negotiate for), conflicting 
interests (something to negotiate about), 
compromise (give and take on points), and 
criteria or objectives (determining the 
objective and the criteria for its achieve-
ment). 
2. Negotiation takes place within the context 
of an environment composed of the political, 
economic, social, and cultural systems of a 
country. The strategies and tactics of nego-
tiation are directly influenced by the envi-
ronment, which varies with each country. 
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3. The negotiator must develop a broad perspective 
that requires to understand the characteristics 
of the broader framework within which he nego-
tiates and to be able to interpret the frame-
work for its implications for the specific 
negotiation he is engaged in. 
4. Over times the four Cs change and the informa-
tion, know-how, and alternatives available to 
the internationl company and the host country 
also change, resulting in a fresh interpreta-
tion of the four Cs, the environment, and 
perspective. 
5. The unique characteristic of international 
versus domestic business negotiations is that 
international negotiations are influenced by 
a wide diversity of environments that require 
changing perspectives which determine the 
selection of appropriate tactics and strategies 
of negotiations to be adopted. (Kapoor, 1975, 
PP· 2-3) 
MAJOR PROBLEMS IN CROSS-CULTURAL BUSINESS NEGOTIATION 
With respect to the broader framework of negotiations 
Kapoor (1975) organized some of the major mistakes made in 
cross-cultural business negotiations into four broad and 
interrelated categories; empathy, role of government, 
decision making characteristics, and organizing for 
negotiations as follows (pp. 5-11 ): 
Empathy 
1. Failure to place yourself in the other person's 
shoes. 
2. Insufficient understanding of different ways of 
thinking. 
3. Insufficient attention to saving face of the 
opponent. 
4. Insufficient knowledge of host country. 
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Role of Government 
1. Insufficient recognition of the nature and 
characteristics of the role of government 
in centrally planned economies. 
2. Insufficient recognition of the relatively 
low status assigned to businessmen. 
3. Insufficient recognition of the role of host 
government in negotiations. 
4. Insufficient recognition of the perception 
of host countries of the role of the inter-
national company's home government in nego-
tiations. 
Decision Making Characteristics 
1. Insufficient recognition of the weights 
assigned to economic and political criteria 
in decision making. 
2. Insufficient recognition of the difference 
between approval at one level and implemen-
tation of such approval at other levels of 
the government. 
3. Insufficient understanding of the role of 
personal relations and personalities in 
decision making by the host government. 
4. Insufficient allocation of time for nego-
tiations. 
Organizing 
1. Insufficient attention to planning for 
changing negotiation strength. 
2. Interference by headquarters. 
3. Insufficient planning for internal communi-
cation and decisions. 
4. Insufficient recognition of the role of 
the negotiator in accommodating the con-
flicting interests of his group with those 
of the opposing groups. 
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5. Insufficient recognition of the loci of 
decision making authority. 
6. Insufficient recognition of the strength 
of competitors. 
7. Insufficient attention to training execu-
tives in the art of negotiation. 
Although the four categories are all interrelated with 
one another and equally essential with regard to the in-
fluence on the negotiation process, this is not the place 
to review all of the issues. This study mainly concerns 
itself with two of the four categories -- empathy and some 
of the basic characteristics of decision-making that can 
be seen most pertinent to an intercultural communication 
perspective. Consequently, though the issue of role of 
governments is important in the negotiation between the 
United States and Japan, the subject will be touched on 
only briefly in favor of concentrating on face-to-face 
interaction factors. 
THE PROCESS OF BUSINESS NEGOTIATION 
The Four Stages of Business Negotiation 
Graham (1981) pointed out that in both Japan and the 
United States business negotiations proceed in the follow-
ing four stages (p.6). 
1 . non-task sounding; 
2. task-related exchange of information; 
3. persuasion; and 
4. concessions and agreement. 
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The first stage, non-task sounding, refers to all those 
activities such as "establishing rapport" or sizing up one 
another, but "does not include information related to the 
business of the meeting." The information exchange in the 
second stage is concerned with "the parties' needs and 
preferences," in other words, "the parties' subjective 
expected utilities of the various alternatives open to the 
interaction." The third stage, persuasion, involves "the 
parties" attempt to modify one another's subjective ex-
pected utilities through the use of various persuasive 
tactics." The final stage of business negotiation refers 
to "the consummation of agreement which often is the summa-
tion of a series of concessions or smaller agreements." 
The key point Graham made here is that "despite the 
consistency of this process across cultures, the content 
and duration of the four stages differs substantially 
between the two cultural groups" (p. 6). This finding is 
congruent with other authors' contention that while the 
overall negotiation process may be similar across cul-
tures, specific implementation differs (Graham, 1983, 
p. 49. See also Sawyer and Guetzhow 1965; Kay 1970; 
Frake 1972; Van Zandt 1970: Condon 1974). Hence, the 
differences of four stages of business negotiations 
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Major Discrepancies in Japanese and American Business 
Negotiation Styles 
A significant difference in business negotiations be-
tween the two cultural groups is presented by Graham's 
(1981, 1983) studies. In American negotiations the out-
comes of business negotiations are primarily determined 
by events at the negotiation table (problem-solving 
oriented bargaining strategies), while interpersonal re-
lations, which refer to both impression formation accuracy 
(sizing up one another, establishing an interpersonal 
rapport) and situational constraints (vertical/status 
power relations between buyer and seller), are a more im-
portant variable in Japanese negotiations. In other words, 
Americans tend to spend the most time in the third stage 
of negotiation, i.e., persuasion where "they openly dis-
agree and use aggressive persuasive tactics such as threats 
and warning;" alternatively, Japanese negotiators spend 
much more time in "trying to understand the situation and 
associated details of one another's bargaining position" 
during the first two stages of the negotiation, so that 
"little persuas ian is necessary" (Graham, 1 981 , p. 7) . 
As a result, Graham's (1981) findings showed that 
"Americans consistently report frustrations because of the 
long periods and great expense of non-task sounding and 
the ambiguous responses during information exchange," 
while "Japanese businessmen report discomfort with the 
American 'need to get down to business now' and their 
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aggressive and relentless persuasive tactics" (p. 7). 
Furthermore, according to Graham (1981, 1983), in nego-
tiation games between Japanese the players who were able 
to make bargaining opponents feel comfortable achieved 
higher profits (implicit power plays). Conversely, the 
negative effect of interpersonal attraction on individual 
profits was found in American negotiations; Americans 
achieved higher profits by making opponents feel uncom-
fortable (explicit power plays). 
However, those findings need to be interpreted with 
caution. With regard to "compliance-gaining" communication 
there are contradictory findings reported by researchers 
using different methods. Lustig and Myers (1983), for 
example, who used the Marwell and Schmitt (1967) strate-
gies found that "American subjects were less likely to 
use persuasive strategies than subjects from five other 
countries. Japanese subjects were found to be unlikely 
users of contingency strategies (e.g., threat, altruism, 
promise, and pregiving) but likely to use dispositional 
strategies (e.g., positive self-feeling, positive ex-
pertise, and positive altercasting)" (Neuliep and 
Hazleton, 1985, p. 390). The study of Burgoon et al., 
(1982) using the same Marwell and Schmitt (1967) strate-
gies also found "a tendency for Asians to have a higher 
likelihood of using virtually all of the persuasive 
strategies, but particularly the positively oriented ones" 
(p. 97). However, Neuliep and Hazleton (1985), who claim 
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a lack of representational validity of the Marwell and 
Schmitt typology, provide data that contradict the find-
ings of Lustig et al., (1983) and Burgoon et al., (1982). 
They found "a clear preference among the American sample 
to use both promise and positive expertise significantly 
more than the Japanese" (p. 401 ). Furthermore, in their 
study the three strategies most preferred by the Japanese 
sample include 1) explanation, 2) direct request, and 3) 
deceit (p. 399). 
Any laboratory experiments are problematic in nature 
in terms of the external validity and the generalizability 
of the findings. Aside from the potential limitations in 
the representativeness of the sample and in the method-
ology as well as the bias of the researcher, which are 
common to any study, the main reasons for the limited 
applicability of game experiments in bargaining lie in 
the lack of "the long-term context" and "the richness 
and importance of the context of bargaining situation" 
(Ikle, 1985, p. 171 ). In real-life settings the value 
of the long-term relationship with the opponent (the 
cumulative long-term effects) often outweighs that of 
the outcome of a particular one-shot-deal negotiation 
(short-term gains), thereby affecting a whole set of 
negotiating behavior among the parties. For this and 
other reasons careful consideration needs to be given 
on "the validity of the principal outcome measure, in-
dividual profits" in Graham's (1983) study. 
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Nevertheless, for the purposes of this study the 
findings presented by Graham (1981, 1983) are considered 
useful in providing some evidence that suggests that re-
gardless of the change of the context (from domestic to 
international) both American and Japanese negotiators have 
cultural idiosyncracies that dictate their negotiating 
behavior, particularly at the unconscious level. There 
are several important cultural considerations involved 
in those findings: 
1) differences in cultural assumptions and value 
orientations; 
2) differences in philosophies of negotiating; 
3) differences in communication styles; 
4) differences in decision-making processes; 
and last but not least, 
5) differences in status relationships (vertical vs. 
horizontal) between buyer and seller. 




PROBLEMS IN THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS THAT ARE ATTRIBUTABLE 
TO CULTURAL DIFFERENCES 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will focus upon identifying some of the 
psycho-and-socio-cultural factors underlying the negotiat-
ing behavior of Japanese and Americans. The research 
question (#2) to be explored is: What are the major problems 
confronted by American businessmen negotiating with the 
Japanese that are attributable to Japanese and American 
cultural differences? The discussion will be centered 
around the following five major issues: 1) differences 
in cultural assumptions and values; 2) differences in 
philosophies of negotiating; 3) differences in communi-
cation styles; 4) differences in decision-making pro-
cesses, and 5) differences in situational constraints 
and status relationships. 
DIFFERENCES IN CULTURAL ASSUMPTIONS AND VALUES 
Definitions 
Cultural assumptions may be understood as basic cul-
tural conceptualizations of reality -- the self, family, 
society, and the universe, which affect people's behavior. 
Stewart (1972) defined cultural assumptions as "abstract, 
organized, and general concepts which pervade a person's 
outlook and behavior" and something that lies behind 
"values" which refer to "oughtness" (pp. 16-17). He 
claimed that in contrast to "cultural norms" (some values 
are called cultural norms) which are explicit and con-
sciously used to describe and justify one's behavior as 
"adaptation of values to specific situations," cultural 
assumptions are so "fundamental to the individual's out-
look" (the individual's subjective reality is built up 
out of internalized cultural assumptions) that "they are 
likely to be considered as a part of the real world and 
therefore remain unquestioned" (Stewart, 1972, pp. 19-20). 
Condon and Yousef (1981 ), for example, developed 
twenty-five sets of cultural assumptions and value orien-
tations, each with three variations. (See Table II. ) 
Although diversity in assumptions and value orientations 
within the same culture does exist, predominance of one 
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orientation can be acknowledged in any given culture. 
Individuals do vary. But dominant regularities of mass 
behavior found in any given culture are describable as 
approximations according to the assumptions and value 
orientations and become more apparent by contrast with 
those of another culture. 
Comparison of Cultural Assumptions and Values: U.S. vs. 
Japan 
A comparison between the United States and Japan can 
be seen in some of the social ramifications of the basic 
differences in conceptualization noted in Table II. 
These specific differences are summarized in Table III. 
Given the vast cultural differences between the 
United States and Japan, culture-based problems in the 
negotiating process could be many. If the existence of 
differing cultural assumptions and value orientations be-
hind behavior is neither acknowledged nor coped with by 
either party, it is most likely that problems will arise 
in the negotiating process. In other words, problems 
could occur when it is assumed that since "the normal 
process of business negotiation is basically the same in 
the United States and Japan," things are done in the 
same way (Graham, 1981, p. 6) In fact, "parties from 
different cultures hold different expectations about 
the normal process of negotiation," which is "one of 
the major difficulties in any cross-cultural business 
negotiations" (Graham, 1981, p. 6). 
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TABLE II 
CULTURAL ASSUMPTIONS AND VALUE ORIENTATIONS 
1. All variations may exist in any one society. 
2. While those orientations listed in the left-hand 
column are those often attributed to the United 
States as a culture, there is no necessary relation-
ship among all of the values in either of the other 
two columns. 
3. This outline is neither definitive nor exhaustive; 
to be applicable to specific communication between 
persons from particular cultures, further refine-
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quent change or for 
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than as guide to 
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serves as an attrac-
t ion but too un-
certain for basis 
of much planning 
Source: Condon, 1984, pp. 64-66. 
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past, present, and 
future, all 
viable, due to de-
ference to age 
(age of organi-









DIFFERENCES IN PHILOSOPHIES OF NEGOTIATING 
Business Relationships 
A fundamental difference in the nature of business 
relationships between the United States and Japan is that 
where the American managerial system is characterized by 
contractual relationships (legalistic and formal), the 
Japanese system is characterized by more interpersonal re-
lationships. This fact has a great deal to do with a basic 
difference in attitudes toward law in the two countries. 
Unlike Western countries where law is a way of life, based 
on "fundamental rights pertaining to the individual and to 
society," in Japan people's lives are revolving, to a great 
extent, around unwritten laws such as "responsibilities, 
duties incumbent on both the individuals and on the 
community" (Norbury and Bownas, 1974, p. 32). In short, 
"the concept of personal 'duties' as opposed to individual 
'rights'" is still the basis of the vertically structured 
Japanese society; it assumes that "if everyone performs 
his duties, there is no need for rights as such to be 
exercised" (Lee, 1974, pp. 34-35). The significantly 
fewer number of Japanese lawyers and judges per capita 
than in any other advanced industrial country is illus-
trative of the minor role played by the legal process in 
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Japan, although it is due largely to a Japanese government 
policy. (See F.K. Upham' s "Litigation in Japan," 1981, pp. 
149-155.) Traditionally, conciliation is the preferred 
means of conflict resolution. 
Contract 
The difference in attitudes toward law is highlighted 
by different approaches toward contracts in business nego-
tiations. That is, as often cited, "Americans try to 
negotiate a contract, while Japanese try to negotiate a 
relationship." To put it another way, traditionally the 
Japanese view a contract as secondary in a negotiated 
transaction. They assume that ''problems can be solved 
on a case by case basis out of the framework of the re-
lationship" in the belief that a business relationship is 
built on the principles of mutual trust rather than on 
legalistic grounds (Lee, 1974, p. 47). As a result, 
"legal documents are usually kept as brief and flexible 
as possible to accommodate the evolving relationship 
between the parties" (Tung, 1984, p. 45). On the other 
hand, the American view of a contract is that it totally 
binds upon the parties since its validity is upheld by 
the courts. Therefore, "it defines the rights and re-
sponsibilities of parties and seek to cover all possible 
contingencies, such as dissolution" (Tung, 1984, p. 45). 
35 
A possible explanation for this difference in the 
nature of business relationships between the two can be 
derived from Hall's (1977) concept of "high and low 
contexts." In short, the difference between high and 
low contexts lies in the degree of contexting needed in 
communication. In a high-context (HC) communication most 
of the information is preprogrammed in the receiver and 
the setting, with only the minimal information vested in 
the explicit code (verbal or written code); therefore, 
meaning is mainly taken from the highly contexted situa-
tion or relationship. In contrast, a low-context (LC) 
communication is one where the mass of the information 
is transmitted in the explicit code so that meaning can 
be as decontexted as possible in interpretation. Con-
sequently, in a HC culture the basic nature of business 
relationships tends to be more interpersonal (desire to 
establish warm and subjective relationships), while there 
is more stress on a legalistic and formal level (stress 
on formal rights and obligations) in a LC culture. 
Although no culture exists exclusively at one end of the 
high-low context continuum, Hall described Japan as being 
a high-context culture and American culture as being to-
ward the lower end on the context scale. However, this 
does not imply that American businessmen are not con-
cerned about good relationships or Japanese businessmen 
do not care about litigation. These two approaches to 
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business are not mutually exclusive. The difference is 
in emphasis. 
Although it has been over one hundred years since 
Japan adopted various Western codes, as Lee (1974) point-
ed out, it seems that borrowed Western legal concepts 
('rights') have never really changed Japanese tradition-
al concepts ('duties') (p. 47). One of the potential 
impediments in the process of negotiation between the 
two cultural groups could be the difference between 
Western rationalization based on principles and Japanese 
rationalization based on circumstances and relationships. 
DIFFERENCES IN COMMUNICATION STYLES 
A survey conducted by Rosalie L. Tung (1984, p. 74) 
regarding factors responsible for the failure of U.S. and 
Japanese business negotiations showed that "communication 
breakdown" was perceived by 69 percent of the respondent 
firms (114 American firms in both Japan and the United 
States) as being responsible for the failure of business 
negotiations. Although the factor of "product character-
istics," which includes two items "Japanese did not need 
products/services" (83 percent) and "too many competitors 
all offering same products/services" (73 percent), was 
perceived by U.S. firms as contributing more to the 
failure of business negotiations, "communication break-
down" was the most frequently mentioned item among those 
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pertaining to the factor "cultural differences." This 
item was followed by such items as "differences in 
business practices" (59 percent) and "differences in 
negotiation styles" (58 percent). (See Table IV and 
also Table V.) 
The Language Barrier and Its Implications 
Given the fact that interpreters are usually used in 
negotiations between the two cultural groups, it may be 
said that communication problems cannot be attributed 
to the language barrier. Yet, in fact, the barrier is 
considerable and many of the concepts are often deeply 
culture-bound and not easily translatable into another 
language. In other words, semantic miscommunication 
is an almost inevitable factor contributing to the 
difficulty of any cross-cultural communication. Tsurumi 
(1981b) pointed out three typical areas of semantic 
communication between Japanese and American negotiators: 
First, the implied meaning of the Japanese phrase 
which is translated as "in principle" (gensoku to 
shite) is the opposite of the English meaning. 
If your Japanese negotiators agree to a certain 
point "in principle" that is tantamount to their 
declaring that they will abide by it 90 percent 
of the time (the remaining 10 percent being sub-
ject to acts of God). I have seen situations 
in which American negotiators nearly blew an 
entire deal merely because of their mental block 
against the Japanese use of the phrase "in prin-
ciple." Second, the same holds true for the 
Japanese interpretation of "gentleman's agree-
ment." In a society in which one's trustworthi-
ness (gentlemanliness) carried high social and 
economic value, a gentleman's agreement -
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TABLE IV 
FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FAILURE OF BUSINESS 
NEGOTIATIONS 
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Figures indicate the percentage of firms in the total sample 
that perceive the extent to which the respective items were 
responsible for failure. 
Source: Tung, 1984, p. 74. 
TABLE V 
FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SUCCESS OF BUSINESS 
NEGOTIATIONS 
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Figures indicate the percentage of firms in the total sample 
that perceive the extent to which the respective items were 
important to success. 
Source: Tung, 1984, p. 73. 
especially on which is witnessed by a respected 
third party - is, again, almost unbreakable. 
Third, Japanese have a tendency to say "hai, 
hai, (yes, yes), or the eq_ui valent of "I under-
stand," or even "I agree," while they are 
listening to you. These phrases merely mean 
that they are listening to you and that they 
understand your positions. (p. 309) 
More importantly, the serious implication of the 
language barrier is that in terms of the Sapir-Whorf 
1 
hypothesis the considerable language barrier itself can 
be a manifestation of the formidable perceptual and cog-
nitive differences between the two. Many communication 
problems seem to stem largely from the two different ways 
of culturally programmed mental and thought processes 
behind the words and concepts that may apparently seem to 
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be understood by both parties. Thought processes here refer 
to forms of reasoning influenced by cultural assumptions and 
value orientations. A simple comparison between Western and 
Eastern patterns of thoughts would be Aristotelian modes of 
reasoning following the logical procedures -- inductive and 
deductive reasoning (linear) versus intuitional and experi-
ential reasoning characterized by Taoism such as Yang and 
Ying which emphasizes the organic harmony between the 
whole and its parts (circular). The components of commu-
1 
The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (1956) proposed that the 
forms of our thoughts are to a great extent unconsciously 
built up on the language system we have learned; thus, 
our language system predisposes us to think certain 
thoughts and perceive certain realities. 
nication style are considered as reflections of all those 
cultural factors, rather than just personal mannerisms. 
In other words, as Barnlund (1975) said, "all communi-
cation behavior derives from a dominant interpersonal 
orientation" in a given culture, which its members 
should be predisposed to assimilate as an absolute neces-
sity for survival as well as a prerequisite to effective-
ness in human interaction in the community (p. 118). 
Japanese and American Communication Styles 
In his Public and Private Self in Japan and the United 
States Barnlund (1975) postulated a basic difference in in-
terpersonal accessibility between Japanese and Americans 
and investigated its consequences in their communication 
behavior. He hypothesized that a critical difference 
between Japanese and American communication styles lies in 
a difference in the degree of disclosure of the public and 
private self in everyday encounters. That is, Japanese 
would prefer a communicative style in which the self made 
accessible to others (the public self) is relatively small, 
while the proportion not disclosed (the private self) is 
relatively large. The opposite would hold true for 
Americans. Hence, if this postulate is true, it is pre-
dicted that Japanese should pref er to avoid further ex-
posure of their inner feelings and thoughts, thereby re-
ducing the scope of verbal disclosure and the intensity 
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of personal involvement and adopting a passive defense 
approach (e.g., silence, withholding contradictory opin-
ions) in threatening interpersonal situations. Americans, 
in contrast, should desire to express and share a larger 
proportion of their inner experience, and therefore pre-
fer more spontaneous form of communication, cultivate 
both verbal and nonverbal expressiveness, and favor more 
aggressive solutions to threatening encounters. Those 
predictions were later supported by examination of a 
"Role Description Checklist," where subjects were asked 
to read the entire list of thirty adjectives and then 
select the five words that "best describe what Americans 
are like in talking to each other" and "best describe 
what Japanese are like in talking to each other." (The 
subjects consisted of a total of one hundred and twenty-
two Japanese college students and total of forty-two 
American college students enrolled in classes in Japan.) 
Stereotypical as they may be, the Japanese described 
themselves and were described (in nearly complete agree-
ment in the relative ordering of the terms between the 
two sets of respondents) as "reserved," "formal," 
"silent," "cautious," and "evasive." By the same token, 
Americans described themselves and were described as 
"self-assertive," "frank," "spontaneous," "informal," 
and "talkative." 
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Barnlund (1975) notes that those cultural character-
istics are not merely different attributes, but consti-
tute "the polar extremes along a single set of attri-
butes" (p. 55). That is, "the qualities that one 
society nurtures -- reserve, formality, and silence in 
one case, and self-assertion, informality, and talkative-
ness in the other -- are the same qualities the other 
society discourages" (p. 57). As Barnlund (1975) says, 
it may be that "most human tendencies are present, in at 
least latent form, in all peoples .... differences between 
cultures are matters of degree and relative frequency, 
not differences of kind" (p. 65). Yet the attribution of 
meaning certainly varies from one culture to another. 
Furthermore, it is also important to note that "agree-
ment on a cultural profile" (suggestions) should not be 
confused with "the validity of that same profile" (truth) 
(Barnlund, 1975, p. 65). In other words, those cultural 
attributes are presented not as "static, 'either-or' des-
criptions of all Japanese or all American," but as "orien-
tations which members of both cultures may fight against, 
strive for and certainly out of which they grow and change" 
(Ramsey and Birk, 1983, p. 239 -- see Table VI and also 
Table VII). 
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Again, these cultural generalizations are not intended 
to stereotype the characteristics of the two cultural groups. 
The real purpose of cultural contrast, which will be dis-
TABLE VI 
COMPARISON OF COMMUNICATION STYLES: USA VS. JAPAN 






























COMMUNICATION AND MANAGEMENT STYLES 
U.S. _Eattern 
explicit, verbal presenta-
tion of information, re-
quests, instruction, etc. 
vagueness and ambiguity 
in communication irri-
tating 
emphasis is on expres-
sive forms - speaking 
and to a lesser ex-




meaning always close to 
surface of words "Say 
what do you mean, and 
mean what you say" 
regarded as inevitable 
though not necessarily 
desirable; problems 
should be dealt with 




tion of others and 
of the situation) 
and some verbal 
presentation 
vagueness and am-
biguity may be 
positive in giving 
latitude in inter-
preting situation 
and in avoiding 
conflicts 




and reading and 
writing skills val-
ued over public 
speaking ability 
meanings often re-
side in the situa-
tion or context, or 
are to be read 
"between the lines" 
or in what is not 
said. 
conflicts and con-
frontations are to 












important to deal with 
issues as they arise 
top down; relatively 
fast; where necessary, 
decision by vote; con-
sensus, though desira-
able, is not expected 
and sought. 




ally in "after 
hours" socializing 
agreement manage-
ment is important, 
to prevent problems 
from occurring; 
good manager is 
aware of problem 
before it is openly 
presented 
upward (from middle 




cuss ion, informal 
as well as formal, 
is expected and 
sought. 
49 
cussed in detail later, lies in overcoming our natural cul-
tural blindness, in other words, in gaining a better under-
standing of where we came from and where they came from that 
aids us in recognizing (and diagnosing) communication prob-
lems before/when they arise. Any generalization allows for 
a countless number of variations and exceptions. 
Nevertheless, there seems to be an almost complete con-
sensus on the basic cultural profiles of the Japanese in 
contrast to those of Americans (as seen in Tables III, VI, 
and VII ) between professionals in two fields; specialists 
in the field of intercultural communication (e.g., Barnlund 
1975; Condon and Yousef 1981; Ramsey and Birk 1983) and 
authors of "doing-business-with-the-Japanese" books (e.g., 
Glazer 1968; Van Zandt 1970; Norbury and Bownas (eds.) 1974; 
Richardson and Ueda (eds.) 1981; Graham and Sano 1984; 
Tung 1984; Zimmerman 1985) or those of Japanese management 
(e.g. Ouchi 1982; Pascale and Athos 1982; Lee and Schwendi-
man (edsJ 1982). Many prescriptive works specifically echo 
Japanese cultural inclination toward reluctance to say "no," 
ambiguous responses, subtle power plays, self-contained non 
-verbal behavior (e.g., long periods of silence, fewer 
negative facial expressions) and so forth as contributing 
2 
factors to communication difficulties for American. 
2 
However, Pascale and Athos (1982) provide a perspec-
tive on the effectiveness of ambiguity, uncertainty, and 
imperfection in communication, which coincides with some 
of the negotiation tactics advocated by many negotiators 
(e.g., Nierenberg, 1971; Ikle, 1985). 
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Japanese Mentality: The Concept of "Amae" 
Definition One useful way of understanding many of 
the aforementioned Japanese characteristics would be to 
examine the concept amae. Doi (1973a) singles out the 
Japanese term amae as "a key concept for understanding not 
only the psychological makeup of the individual Japanese but 
of the structure of Japanese society as a whole" (p. 28). 
Although there is no exact English equivalent of the word 
amae or amaeru (the verb; amae is its noun form), amaeru can 
be translated to mean to "depend and presume upon another's 
love" (Doi, 1 982, p. 218) . Originally the term amae re-
fers to the psychology of the infant in its relationship 
to its mother, a sense of oneness between mother and child, 
the unwillingness to be separated from one's environment. 
The world of amae, where subject and object merge, enfolds 
everything, the good and the bad alike in a nondiscrimina-
tory fashion. It is warm and the world of filial piety to 
the insider, but when viewed from the outside it is illo-
gical, exclusivist, private, and even egocentric (Doi, 
1973a, PP· 76-79) · 
At the conscious level, the word amae, associated with 
infantile mentality, does evoke negative connotations in 
the minds of the Japanese; children (and even adults) are 
often told not to amaeru too much. However, Doi's concep-
tion of amae goes beyond the simply negative nuances of 
the everyday usage of the word. Far more than they are 
aware, the amae mentality of the Japanese is so ingrained 
in their psyches that amae has become an almost underlying 
premise that is unconsciously operating (both positively 
and negatively) in the Japanese mode of interpersonal 
communication. For this reason, it would seem that Japan-
ese interpersonal communication tends to rely heavily upon 
nonverbal means. "The psychological prototype of amae lies 
in the psychology of the infant in its relationship to its 
mother" (Doi, 1 973a, p. 7 4) . Implied by it is the psychol-
ogy of the "nonverbal" baby (the amae-receiver) who ex-
pects the mother (the amae-giver) to be always sensitive 
enough to read its mind and respond to its needs and ex-
pectations with care. A good (sensitive) communicator in 
the Japanese sense thus has a great deal to do with the 
ability to perform this amae-giver's role; the ideal amae 
communication is the one where both parties constantly 
feel each other out to assure mutuality (another person's 
good will) by fulfilling simultaneously the role of both 
amae-giver and amae-receiver. This form of communication 
is often referred to as "haragei" (hara-[gut]-gei-[art]), 
which is interpreted to mean gut communication or "the 
art of guessing inner thoughts by nonverbal means" 
(Ramsaey and Birk, 1983, p. 246). It is regarded as the 
highest level of communication skill one can reach in 
Japan. Traditionally the Japanese have held verbali-
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zation in very low esteem, whereas they have always held 
reticence or taciturnity in very high esteem. Many 
Japanese proverbs are suggestive of the Japanese distrust 
of words. (See Ramsey and Birk 1983, p. 245.) As such, 
within Japanese communication, silence is more an acceptable 
and positive form with longer duration and more frequency 
than its American counterpart. Consequently in negotiation 
situations "a major difference between a U.S. and a Japanese 
negotiating team is the amount of time the Americans speak 
and the observance of long silence on the part of the 
Japanese" (Tung, 1984, p. 167). A similar observation is 
also provided by Graham (1981) and Zimmerman (1985) about 
the Americans' responses to (intolerance for) Japanese 
silence: either they make quite unnecessary concessions, 
or they do most of the talking, ending up with little 
3 
understanding of the Japanese point of view. Although 
Japanese employment of silence may be a result of their 
inclination to adopt, in Barnlund' s ( 1975) words, "passive-
withdrawing defense to threats" as opposed to American 
"active-aggressive form of defense" against an unreasonable 
proposal or an unjustified attack, silence may be a simple 
3 
Ramsey and Birk (1983) also express a similar viewpoint 
on silence. " ... non-Japanese must learn to become more com-
fortable in situations of silence and refrain from filling 
in the space with questions or small talk. It is also im-
perative to train oneself to be able to wait as long as a 
minute, after inquiring about understanding or asking for a 
suggestion, before assuming that no response will be forth-
coming" (p. 246). 
reflection of their cultural speech mannerism to which 
Americans are not accustomed. 
Other-Directedness As has been seen, Japanese 
sensitivity, at the core of which the amae mentality lies, 
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is closely related to their other-directed orientation and 
their inability (or unwillingness) to divorce themselves from 
the object (lack of objectivity). Other-directedness refers 
to an inclination to "respond with great sensitivity to the 
expectations and preferences of others" (Takeuchi, 1984, p. 
56). On the negative side, the other-directed person is, 
therefore, disposed to say what others want to hear rather 
than what he/she wants to say. Inability to depersonalize 
objects (or words) from the individual certainly prevents any 
candid discussion from taking place. Doi (1973b) calls the 
Japanese psychological mechanism of interpersonal orienta-
tion "the Japanese 2-fold structure of consciousness"; 
omote (face) and ura (mind). Literally they refer to the 
fore and back sides of things. Omote means "the patterns 
one would show to others; ura, "those private and intimate 
thoughts which generally are not to be shown to others" 
(p. 258). They are connected to probably more familiar 
concepts tatemae (form) and honne (substance) respectively. 
In an universal sense, they are related to Barnlund's (1975) 
concepts of the public and private self discussed earlier, 
and they are certainly not exclusively Japanese traits, as 
Doe says. However, the reasons why the Japanese need to 
make much of the distinction between omote and ura are, 
first of all, according to Doi (1973b), related to psycho-
logy amae, which is also basically an universal trait, yet 
particularly prevails in Japanese society with its speci-
fic connotation, "a longing to merge with others" (p. 259). 
Thus, Doi (1973b) explains: "Omote or tatemae is a token 
that the mutuality of members of groups is preserved, 
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while ura or honne which acknowledges the inevitable frus-
trations in amae is given free rein as long as it does not 
dispute the former. This is surely a very ingenious way of 
handling ambivalent feelings" (p. 259). Another possible 
explanation for "the Japanese 2-fold structure of conscious-
ness" would be that the distrust of words (verbalization) 
coupled with the value placed on interpersonal harmony 
has somehow confined the function of the verbal communica-
tion more on a ritualized and superficial level; conse-
quently, Japanese are practically urged to allocate each 
of the operations of verbal and nonverbal means for a 
different purpose; verbal communication for omote (face) 
or tatemae (form) and a more sought and necessitated non-
verbal form of communication (e.g., haragei) for ura 
(mind) or honne (substance). Again, mastery of the mecha-
nism of omote and ura is, by and large, the basic nature 
of the socialization process in almost every human society. 
Yet a society like Japan where the harmonious integration 
of group is foremost seems to encourage this trait further 
as the necessary coping skills entailed by the social re-
lationships. 
Social Implications In Doi's (1982) words, "in Japan 
parental dependency is fostered and its behavioral patterns 
institutionalized into social structure" (p. 218). For 
instance, the peculiar relationship between employer and 
employee in Japan seems to bear some analogy with an 
alternative form of a parent-child relationship -- the 
relationship between an adoptive parent and an adoptive 
child. Unlike the American recruitment practices where 
people with practical work experience are taken on as the 
need arises, many Japanese companies (major firms in 
particular) recruit once a year only young rookies with no 
experience but high potential for a generalist position, 
just as many prospective adopted parents prefer to adopt 
newborn babies rather than adopt older children who have 
already been processed to some extent. Japanese companies 
aim at developing emotional ties (trust, commitment) with 
the employees by nurturing them in the long-running working 
relationships (e.g. investment in training employees along 
with career circulation within an organization, participa-
tory decision-making, concern for the social and emotional 
needs of the employees such as company outings for the 
employees and their families, financal assistance for the 
purchase of construction of employees' homes, etc.). The 
employees who are indulged in such an amae treat, in turn, 
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are obliged to repay the amae by their complete loyalty to 
the organization, which is the kind of amae the employer 
expects from his employees. 
As such, Japanese experience frustration with an "in-
sensitive" person who does not appreciate amae (or obliga-
tory relationships) as much as Americans get frustrated 
and even furious with an "insensitive" person who in one 
way or other threatens their independence or individual 
rights or freedoms. (As Doi says, the Western concept of 
freedom depends on a rejection of amae as opposed to the 
Japanese concept of freedom which means a permission for 
amae.) 
Implications for Negotiation 
As mentioned earlier, predictions from Barnlund's 
(1975) notion of "public and private self" about a basic 
difference in interpersonal accessibility between Japanese 
and Americans are consistent with the observations of many 
authors on Japanese business and negotiation as well as 
with his own survey. Barnlund (1975) postulated that the 
Japanese would prefer a communication style in which "the 
public self" (the self accessible to others) is relative-
ly small, while "the private self" (the proportion not dis-
closed) is relatively large. The opposite would be true 
of Americans. One of the difficulties facing American 
negotiators communicating with the Japanese is the Japan-
ese concept of tatemae (form) and honne (substance), which 
t . 
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is closely related to the Barnlund's concept of "public and 
private self." The Japanese "public self" tends to take 
the form of tatemae and their honne is more likely to be 
confined in "the private self." To take an example: 
... Regarding the ambiguous responses of 
Japanese, the laboratory results indicate that 
informative and credible bargaining strategies 
of opponents have no effects on negotiation out-
comes between Japanese. Apparently the Japanese 
negotiator follows the cultural double standard 
of tatemae and honne. Tatemae can be trans-
lated as "truthful," and honne as "true mind." 
It is important for Japanese to be polite and 
to communicate the tatemae while reserving the 
possibly offending, but also informative honne ... 
Japanese often describe Americans as honest and 
frank, but to the point of discomfort for Japan-
ese. Finally, eye contact is much less fre-
quent during Japanese negotiations, thus limit-
ing leakage of potentially off ending feelings 
and keeping intact the honne. To the American 
point of view the distinction between tatemae 
and honne seems hypocritical indeed. However, 
the discrepancy is borne by Japanese in good 
conscience. (Graham, 1981 , p. 7 -- al so see Table I ) 
Doi (1973b) calls this so-called cultural double stan-
dard "the Japanese 2-fold structure of consciousness" (p. 
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258). The value of maintaining harmoneous interpersonal re-
lationships may be a major contributing factor for that. But 
it would also seem that a culprit of the Japanese heavy em-
phasis on communicating the tatemae as a face-saving device 
is their inability to depersonalize objects (e.g., criti-
cism) from the individual. It is, again, rooted in the 
amae mentality, where subject and object merge, a sense 
of oneness between mother and child, and the unwilling-
ness to be separated from one's environment. Conversely, 
Americans' directness and confrontiveness in communication 
stem largely from their ability to impersonalize a part 
of the person from his/her whole personality. Although 
face-saving is important in any culture, as Tung (1984) 
says, "the difference is in the level of sensitivity and 
the ability to cope with it" (p. 143). In general, 
Japanese are more sensitive in this area and are less 
capable of coping with affronts than Americans. Hence, 
Tung (1984) suggests that "in negotiation the Americans 
should never back the Japanese partner into a corner but 
should always give the other side sufficient room to 
maneuver and change positions without a loss of face" 
(p. 60). 
DIFFERENCES IN DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES 
Conception of Decision-Making 
Peter F. Drucker (1974) pointed out that a critical 
difference between Japanese and American decision-making 
is the difference between the emphasis on "defining the 
question" and the emphasis on "giving an answer": 
In the West, all the emphasis is on the 
answer to the question. Indeed, our books 
on decision-making try to develop systema-
tic approaches to giving an answer. To the 
Japanese, however, the important element 
in decision-making is defining the question. 
The important and crucial steps are to decide 
whether there is a need for a decision and 
what the decision is about. And it is in 
this step that the Japanese aim at attain-
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ing consensus. Indeed, it is the step that, 
to the Japanese, is the essence of the de-
cision. The answer to the question (what 
the West consider the decision) follows 
from its definition. (p. 467) 
To take a specific example of this holistic Japanese 
approach to decision-making: 
I once watched a Japanese company work 
through a proposal for a joint venture re-
ceived from a well-known American company, 
with whom the Japanese had done business for 
many years. The Orientals did not even dis-
cuss the joint venture at the outset. They 
started out with the question "Do we have to 
change the basic direction of our business?" 
As a result, a consensus emerged that change 
was desirable; management decided to go out 
of a number of old businesses and start in a 
number of new technologies and markets; the 
joint venture was to be one element of a 
major new strategy. (Drucker, 1974, p. 469) 
The key to this Japanese approach is that the whole process 
is focused on "finding out what the decision is really 
about, not what the decision should be," as a result, 
"the focus is on alternatives rather than on the 'right 
solution'" (pp. 469-470). Interestingly enough, this 
seems to be a complete account of Barnlund's (1975) re-
mark that "if an American cannot understand why he gets 
such puzzling answers to such simple questions, the 
Japanese cannot understand how anyone can give such simple 
answers to such puzzling questions" (p. 134). 
The Locus of Decision-Making Authority 
If the first managerial skill in the West is the 
making of effective decisions as the issuer of edicts (the 
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top-down style of decision-making), the most crucial mana-
gerial skill in Japan is coordination skills as the facilita-
tor of decision-making (the bottom-up style of decision-
making). In other words, where the Western decision-making 
process largely revolves around the responsibility of a 
specific decision-maker (mainly senior management), the 
decision-making process in Japan is normally based on build-
ing a consensus by "maximum consultation" (Nakane, 1970, 
p. 145) among the individuals who will be involved in the 
execution. (The other side of the coin is that in this way 
the system protects a particular individual from "losing 
face.") As a result, what is arrived at is "a consensus 
for execution," not "a decision 'on command'" (Ballon, 
1974, pp. 106-107). Consequently, the process eliminates 
selling a decision. The point West calls a decision is 
already the commencement of the execution in the Japanese 
system. Predecision delay of the Japanese decision-making 
is, thus, offset by swift implementation after the decision, 
whereas the reverse time allocation is typical of the 
American system. 
Communitarian Sentiment in The Japanese Decision-Making 
Process 
Tsurumi (1981a) explains how the process of building 
a consensus operates in Japanese firms as follows: 
The commitment of individual employees to 
the widely accepted goals of their firm has 
produced an often mentioned decision-making 
system in Japanese firms that is called 
ringi seido. Observers of this decision-
making process will note that new proposals 
--marketing or investment decision, for 
example--are often initiated at the lower or 
middle echelons of the firm. These proposals 
are passed along through the hierarchy, col-
lecting seals of approval or undergoing minor 
revisions, on their way up to the president. 
The initiators or collaborating parties of 
such proposals are busily engaged on an in-
formal basis in pinpointing key personalities 
whose support is needed. Some proposals fade 
away or die on their journey to the top 
echelon. But those proposals that do survive 
cannot be attributed solely to their initia-
tor(s). By the time a proposal is accepted 
by the top management, there will be a cor-
porate consensus concerning its feasibility. 
(pp. 9-10) 
The advantage of this seemingly inefficient Japanese de-
cision-making process is that it almost guarantees the 
commitment of the individuals involved to action and re-
sults. Drucker (1974) calls such a Japanese decision-
making process as participation in "decision-thinking" (or 
genuine participation in responsibility), not participa-
tion in decision-making (p. 258). Nakane (1970), on the 
other hand, terms it as a kind of "communitarian senti-
ment, with as major premise, a high degree of cohesion 
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and consensus with the group" (p. 147). That is, the under-
current of feeling is that "after all we are in the same 
boat, and we should live peacefully without leaving any-
one behind as a stranger." And she thinks that in Japan 
this sort of sentiment has made it possible for autho~i-
tarian power to be exercised in the name of 'democracy,' 
which in the Japanese sense is identified with consensus 
decision-making on the basis of maximum consultation, not 
of a truly democratic discussion. (The reason why it is 
extremely difficult for the Japanese to engage in a truly 
democratic discussion is attributable to their vertical 
interpersonal relationships, which will be discussed in 
the following section.) A consensus in Japan, thus, means 
acceptance rather than agreement. The power-exercise of a 
Japanese leader is much restricted by and heavily relies on 
his subordinates' acceptance. 
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The Japanese organization, in fact, is more autocratic 
than its American counterpart in the sense that interperson-
al relationships are built along hierarchical orientation 
that characterizes the structure of Japanese society itself. 
Yet the power relationship between superior and subordinate 
is counterbalanced by "informal contacts which give the sub-
ordinate men a feeling of being 'in the same boat'," 
namely, "emotional security" (amae), which is "the foremost 
requirement for a Japanese engaged in co-operative work" 
(Nakane, p. 80, p. 147). It is the essence of a vertical 
relationship known as oyabun-kobun (leader-follower) rela-
tionship in Japan. it seems to be the reason why "authority 
from the top is always matched by responsibility from the 
bottom up," which Drucker (1974) defined as the real mean-
ing of "consensus decision," despite many contradictions 
involved in the Japanese decision-making process and group 
dynamics. 
Implications for Negotiation 
Concensus-building practices in the Japanese decision-
making process can cause irritation to Americans. First, 
the process of building a consensus is time-consuming. 
American negotiators often complain of the length of time 
it takes their Japanese counterparts to reach decisions. 
It might make Americans wonder whether a decision was 
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made at all or who holds power in Japanese companies. 
Second, building a consensus among those who will be 
affected by a decision means that Japanese negotiators have 
to carefully build a foundation of support from everyone in-
volved. Consequently, Japanese representatives "review and 
re-review the facts" (Zimmerman, 1985, p. 1 22) and "ask end-
less questions" during information exchange (Graham, 1981, 
p. 7 -- see Table I). Pascale and A thos ( 1982) note that 
"frequently, we hear stories of perplexed American firms re-
ceiving and briefing a delegation from their Japanese busi-
ness partner only to receive a follow-up delegation two 
weeks later which requires the same briefing" (p. 175). 
(All of this seems to be indicative of "defining the ques-
tion" (Drucker, 1974) discussed earlier, too.) Furthermore, 
building acceptance is usually undertaken informally be-
fore the formal ringi seido begins to maintain harmony in 
the actual meeting. Such informal communication is called 
nemawashi (preliminary groundwrok) in Japanese. Hence, 
Graham (1981) comments: "for Japanese the negotiation is 
more a ritual, with actions predetermined and outcomes 
prespecified by status relation" (p. 8). 
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A possible explanation for this Japanese inclination 
toward nemawashi and to spend much time trying to under-
stand the situation and associated details of one another's 
bargaining position is that it is not only because Japanese 
place more value on maintaining harmoneous relationships 
than on being frank and open, but also in terms of Hall's 
(1977) concept of "high and low contexts" because they 
feel uncomfortable without any firm context to belong to 
(high-context culture). They, in turn, seem to let the 
context they have programmed pass through a decision-mak-
ing process. 
Another potential problem area in the decision making 
would be a difference in a Japanese "holistic" approach 
versus an American "quantitative" approach (Ramsay and 
Birk, 1983 -- see Table VI ) . Americans' needs to quanti-
fy an object in numbers and percentages, not just per-
ceiving it in "feelings," again, have to do with their 
preference for fragmentization of an object rather than 
dealing with it as a whole. For example, such an deci-
sion-making system as "breaking down the decision into 
component parts and assessing risk at each stage of the 
project" is a familiar technique to many American mana-
gers, Zimmerman ( 1985) says in retrospect, "the Japanese 
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executive had a great deal of trouble understanding the 
whole concept ... mainly because the decision-making system 
... was so alien to their own corporate situation and ex-
perience" (p. 121). Conseq_uently, the difference tends 
to manifest itself in the negotiation situation as follows: 
Regarding the fourth and final stage of 
business negotiations, Americans tend to 
make concessions throughout, settling one 
issue, then proceeding to the next. Thus, 
the final agreement is a sum of the several 
concessions, and progress can be measured 
easily. The Japanese tend to make conces-
sions at the end of the negotiation and 
agreements are concluded rather abruptly 
from the American point of view.(Graham, 
1981 , p. 7) 
DIFFERENCES IN SITUATIONAL CONSTRAINTS AND STATUS 
RELATIONSHIPS 
Situational Constraints, the Role of the Negotiator 
Graham's (1981, 1983) studies of cross-cultural 
business negotiations examined the impact of a situational 
constraint, the role of the negotiator (buyer and seller) 
on individual profit levels. In his samples of three 
cultural groups -- Brazilians, Japanese and Americans, 
buyers in generaldid better than sellers in the simulated 
business negotiations. Yet, the role of a player was the 
key variable only in negotiations amongst Japanese, where 
buyers consistently achieved higher profit solutions than 
sellers. In American and Brazilian samples the relations 
between role and individual profit levels lacked statis-
tical significance. When Americans are negotiating with 
other Americans, a representational (problem-solving 
oriented) bargaining strategy was the most important 
variable. But in negotiations amongst only Japanese, 
the representational bargaining strategy had no in-
fluence on the player's performances. "For Japanese, 
the negotiation is more a ritual (tatemae and amae are 
foremost), with actions predetermined and outcomes 
prespecified by status relations (minds are changed 
'behind the scenes' ) " (Graham, 1981 , p. 8). Further, 
the degree to which Japanese bargaining behaviors are 
constrained by status relations was observed by Graham 
(1981) through videotaped business interactions: 
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"Japanese, like Americans, do use aggressive persuasive 
tactics. However, in Japanese negotiations, threats, 
warnings and like tend to be used only by the buyer and in 
the later stages of the negotiations (when all else fails)" 
(p. 8). 
Status Relationships: Horizontal vs. Vertical 
The horizontal relationship between American buyer 
and seller as opposed to the vertical relationship between 
Japanese buyer and seller is, in fact, one of the most in-
teresting (and impressive) cultural differences the author 
(a native Japanese) has perceived in her everyday ex-
perience in the United States. However, this difference 
in interpersonal relationships is not, of course, con-
fined to commercial aspects of the both societies; rather 
it is a manifestation of the fundamental differences in 
social relationships between the two cultures. American 
culture attaches high value to equality in social rela-
tionships. Although ironically the emphasis on the "value 
of individualism and freedom" sometimes creates problems 
of "inequality and discrimination in social relationships 
with persons of different racial and ethnic groups" (as 
a result of "the freedom to decide who to relate with, 
what groups to join, and how to conduct social relation-
ships"), yet the basic interpersonal equality is espoused 
as the cultural premise (Samovar et al., 1981, pp. 78-79). 
Even when different hierarchical levels exist between two 
persons their interactions tend to be conducted in such 
a way as to establish equality. By contrast, in Japanese 
society the basic social relationships are formed by 
"multiplication of a vertical relation between two in-
dividuals" (Na~ane, 1970, p. 44). The bases for vertical 
relationships are age, sex, rank (in and of an organiza-
tion), roles and so on. (It should be noted that the 
vertical relation in Japan is not based on the inherited 
class stratification as seen in England or India.) The 
codes (both verbal and nonverbal) that differentiate 
appropriate situational behavior for Japanese are much 
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more complex and delicate than their American counter-
parts. The Japanese language cannot be spoken appropriate-
ly without status and age considerations, which determine 
4 
''the degree of honorific content and politeness." Even a 
one-year age difference between two persons requires the 
younger (thus the lower in the status position) to use a 
certain amount of honorifics towards the older unless they 
are very close friends. Thus, the Japanese language and 
the consciousness of status are interlocked with one 
another. The Japanese language, as a product of the 
value of status difference, seems to be functioning as 
the biggest reinforcer of the ranking consciousness in 
Japanese society. 
Nakane (1970) claims the "the consciousness of rank," 
namely, "the lack of a discipline for relationships be-
tween equals," has prevented the Japanese from developing 
a logical procedure of the basic steps of reasoning 
(pp. 34-35). Open expression of opinions is curbed by 
ranking order. A bold negative expression is rarely em-
ployed by a junior for fear of hurting the feelings of 
a superior or even for fear of being cast out from the 
group. Freedom to speak out in a group is, thus, deter-
mined by a man's place in it; self-expression has to be 
sought within the framework of the group. As a result, 
4 
Status differences not only determine correct pre-
fixes and suffixes to be used but differentiate an appro-
priate word to be used from many synonyms. For instance, 
there are more than ten status-related synonyms in 
Japanese that correspond to the first personal pronoun 
"I" in English. 
68 
in negotiation situations "the chief negotiator on the 
Japanese team would do most of the talking; the others 
are generally silent observers .... while Americans tend 
to give the floor to whoever the expert is" (Tung, 1984, 
p. 167). This view is shared by Barnlund (1975) saying 
that "the lack of complicating status considerations may 
ease communication, make for greater approachability with 
strangers, and encourage greater consistency in verbal, 
nonverbal, and defensive messages" (p. 164). 
Implications for Negotiation 
Hence, given the horizontal relationship between 
American negotiators and the vertical relationship be-
tween Japanese negotiators, what would happen in nego-
tiations between the two cultural groups? Here is 
Graham's (1981) postulate: "A Japanese seller and an 
American buyer will get along fine, while the American 
seller and the Japanese buyer will have great problems 
(p. 9). That is, the Japanese seller coming to the U.S. 
to market his products "naturally assumes the lower 
status position and acts accordingly" (he adjusts his 
business and negotiation practices to fit the American 
system), and a sale is made. On the other hand, "the 
American seller expects to be treated as an equal and 
acts accordingly; the Japanese buyer is likely to view 
this rather brash behavior in a lower status seller as 
inappropriate and lacking in respect." Consequently, a 
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sale is much less likely. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Factors for success or failure of U.S. and Japanese 
business negotiations are numerous (see Tables IV and 
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V ). Economic considerations must be a foremost moti-
vation to agree on a joint participation. However, cul-
tural understanding could lead to an increased ability to 
accommodate nehavior necessary for successful business 
negotiations. From this point of view this chapter attempt-
ed to demonstrate the degree to which cultural (uncon-
scious) factors condition negotiating behavior in five 
areas: cultural assumptions and values; philosophies of 
negotiating; communication styles; decision-making pro-
cesses; and situational constraints and status relation-
ships. In the following chapter we will discuss some of 
the intercultural communication principles that provide 
a theoretical framework for a better understanding of such 
unconscious, cultural factors. 
CHAPTER IV 
INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION PRINCIPLES 
INTRODUCTION 
Major purposes of the literature review on the con-
cepts of intercultural communication principles in this 
chapter are based on the following assumptions on nego-
tiation: 
negotiation: 1) all negotiations (all human inter-
actions) are interculturally loaded; 
2) negotiation is a process of cul-
tural synergy between two or more 
differing entities. 
This chapter, therefore, is intended to provide a 
theoretical framework that helps understand and address 
culture-biased communication problems in business nego-
tiation, thereby lending some insight into the applicabi-
lity and usefulness of intercultural communication per-
spective in enhancing negotiating skills. The research 
question (#3) to be asked in this chapter is: What are 
some relevant intercultural communication principles, and 
what is the applicability and usefulness of an inter-
cultural perspective in enhancing negotiating skills? 
DEFINITIONS 
Culture 
definitions: 1) the deposit of knowledge, experiences, 
beliefs, values, attitudes, meanings, 
hierarchies, religion, timing, roles, 
spatial relations, concepts of the uni-
verse, and material objects and posses-
sions acquired by a large group of 
people in the course of generations 
through individual and group striving 
(Samovar et al., 1981 , p. 24.) . 
2) objective and subjective culture 
objective culture: either artifacts and 
technologies that produced them (pots-
herds, tools, habitations, transports, 
paintings, and so on) or observable 
human activities (norms of behavior 
generally, interpersonal roles, child-
rearing practices, institutional struc-
tures, etc.) 
subjective culture: human cognitive 
processes, either non-linguistic (per-
ceptual st~les, motivational patterns, 
and skills) or linguistic (meanings, 
beliefs, and the linguistic structures 
which express them) (Osgood et al., 
1975, P· 335). 
3) culture 1, the recurring patterns which 
characterize a community as a homeostatic 
system, and culture 2, people's standard 
for perceiving, judging, and acting. 
Culture 1, moreover, is an artifact or 
product of the human use of culture 2 ... 
individuals can be said to possess 
culture 2 but not culture 1, which is the 
property of a community as a social-eco-
logical system (Goodenough, 1961, p. 522). 
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functions: 1) the provider of the skills, knowledge, cus-
toms, traditions, material objects, and 
social organization that make living in 
groups impossible; 
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2) the medium through which a society survives 
and perpetuates itself by the survival, re-
production, and training of the individuals 
who comprise the society; and 
3) the basis of the structure, stability, and 
security that both individuals and a so-
ciety must possess if they are to maintain 
themselves (Samovar et al., 1981, p. 26). 
the nature: dynamic (processual), persistent, enduring, 
omnipresent, and riddled with contradictions 
and extremes (Samovar et al., 1981, p. 18, 
pp. 23-27). 
This study is concerned primarily with subjective 
culture (in the sense of culture 2) possessed by "an aggre-
gation of people (a community's members, collectively)" 
(Goodenough, 1961, p. 522) rather than with subjective cul-
ture of each individual. The term culture used in this 
study, therefore, refers to subjective culture of people 
in the collective sense. However, this does not mean to 
undermine the importance of individual meanings. Rather, 
the basic stance of this study lies in the view that all 
human interactions are interculturally loaded in that 
differing cognitive and perceptual orientations of each 
individual result in his/her own unique way of creating 
reality, or subjective culture. Thereby, although this 
is not intended to equate the complexities and inten-
sities of communication between people of different 
nationalities with those of communication between indivi-
duals of the same nationality, this study takes the view 
that employment of an intercultural communication perspec-
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tive is an indispensable prerequisite for effective human 
communication of any sort to take place. 
Intercultural Communication Principles 
Frequently the terms "cross-cultural communication" 
and "intercultural communication" are used interchangeably. 
However, a distinction is sometimes made between them. 
For example, Prosser (1978) defined intercultural communi-
cation as opposed to cross-cultural communication as follows: 
Intercultural communication ... is defined as 
the interpersonal communication which has the 
added characteristics of similarities and 
differences in language, nonverbal cues, 
attitudes, perceptions, norms, values, and 
though-patterning. It is subsumed in the 
cultural level of the hierarchical model and 
is related to such subsets as intra/inter-
racial, intra/interethnic, countercultural, 
and intracultural communication. While inter-
cultural communication is seen as much more 
spontaneous and unplanned with a relatively 
small number of persons, cross-cultural 
communication is considered the interaction 
on a much more formal, planned, and routinized 
basis. Intercultural communication is con-
sidered much more two-way communication, while 
cross-cultural communication is considered one-
way, from a small group to a larger group. 
(p. 299) 
In this study, however, the terms intercultural commu-
nication and cross-cultural communication are employed 
synonymously. In its simplest sense intercultural communi-
cation is understood as communication between people from 
different cultural backgrounds, where "a message encoded 
in one culture must be decoded in another" (Samovar et 
al., 1981, p. 27). A message means any verbal and non-
verbal behavior to which meaning is attributed. Behavior 
may occur consciously or unconsciously, intentionally or 
unintentionally. The fact that the decoder (a message 
receiver) does not share the same cultural meanings with 
the encoder (a message producer) means that the meaning 
intended by the encoder is modified under the influence 
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of the decoding culture when the message is processed. 
Many of the difficulties inherent in intercultural commu-
nication stem from such culturally differing attributions 
of meaning in the coding processes of communication. Both 
encoding and decoding are internal perceptual operations 
in the sense that a message is created or processed in 
light of the encoder's or the decoder's perceptual frame 
of reference. Although perception is a highly personal-
ized process, the framework of it is primarily a product 
of culture. 
The significance of learning an intercultural communi-
cation perspective lies in the fact that much of the 
cultural implications are outside our awareness. It is 
due largely to the elusive nature of culture and of its 
influence upon us. The elusive nature of culture mani-
fests itself, in Singer's (1982) terms, in "shared, often 
unarticulated, and sometimes unarticulatable patterns of 
perception, communication, and behavior," which are, in 
fact, ref erred to as "a cul tu re" ( p. 58) . 
76 
The term "intercultural communication principles" here 
is used in a generic sense to refer all the concepts that 
help examine variables in intercultural communication pro-
cesses and provide directions of improvement in communi-
cative behavior in intercultural transactions. Specifically, 
in this chapter, the following concepts will be explored: 
awareness of cultural contrast, empathy, and ethnore-
lativism. 
AWARENESS OF CULTURAL CONTRAST 
Awareness of cultural contrast can be seen to include 
three types of cultural dimensions suggested by Samovar 
et al., (1981 ): 1) an awareness of the cultural patterns 
that influence upon our own perception, thinking, encoding 
and other communication behaviors (cultural self-aware-
ness); 2) an awareness of the cultural patterns influenc-
ing the communication behavior of people from other cul-
tures (an awareness of other culture); and 3) identifica-
tion of cultural differences and their effect on commu-
nication (an awareness of cultural value conflict) (p. 60). 
In this section the discussion will be centered around 
the first two dimensions, i.e., cultural self-awareness 
and an awareness of other cultures -- ethnocentric aware-
ness. 
Cultural Self-Awareness 
As long as our way of perceiving the world ... 
on which our communication styles and 
behavior patterns are based ... is "out of 
awareness" it is not accessible to being 
deliberately changed, managed, or influenced. 
(Hoopes, 1979, p. 16) 
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The Significance of Cultural Self-Awareness The sig-
nificance of cultural self-awareness can be drawn from a few 
interrelated terms that all stem from the nature intrinsic to 
culture and to its members as cultural beings: low level of 
cultural self-awareness (Samovar et al., 1981 ); projected 
cognitive similarity (Kraemer, 1973); and a self-reference 
criteria (Lee, 1966). 
One of the major contributing factors to the low 
level of cultural self-awareness is our internalization of 
our own cultural patterns in the course of socialization, 
which results in burying the most of the influences of 
culture below the level of our consciousness and blurs the 
demarcation between the culturally-programmed conscious/ 
unconscious mind and the culturally influenced and yet 
unconstrained one (one's personality predisposition). The 
influences that culture has had on us usually remain 
unquestioned until our first encounter with people of the 
other culture. In other words, to the extent that our 
cultural experiences are limited mainly to the sphere of our 
own (resulting in the lack of experience to learn to exercise 
multiple perspectives), we are most likely to subject our-
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selves to the assumption that under the similar circum-
stances everyone thinks in the same way (projected cognitive 
similarity). However, projected cognitive similarity 
or a self-reference criterion (the unconscious reference 
to one's cultural values in judging situations in a new 
cultural environment) is by nature an unconscious emo-
tional operation in which even those who are well equipped 
with intercultural communication skills often find them-
selves entrapped. Cultural self-awareness is, in this 
sense, to come to grips with the emotionality of ourselves, 
i.e., "awareness of emotional self" (Gudykunst and Hammer, 
1983, p. 140) and our inherent problems as cultural beings 
(the unconscious nature of our perception) separate of the 
degree of our intelligence. 
Developing cultural self-awareness is a process of 
the individual's "becoming more 'functionally aware' and 
having more knowledge of the degree to which his percep-
tion and his behaviors are culturally conditioned" (Hoopes, 
1979, p. 13, p. 16). By "functionally aware" Hoopes 
means "with an awareness that translates into an ability 
to alter or manage our behavior in intercultural contexts." 
It is true that cultural self-awareness can be learned 
both at the cognitive and the affective levels. However, 
cognitively-learned cultural self-awareness cannot be 
consummated or validated if not accompanied by the emo-
tional affirmation through affective learning which in-
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valves actual, and usually painful experience in real-life 
intercultural settings. On the other hand, affective learn-
ing that lacks a solid conceptual basis is prone to have 
weaknesses in its limited application (J. Bennett, 1986, p. 
118). Also equally true, however, is that no amount of 
one's knowledge or awareness can guarantee that one would 
act out the appropriate patterns of behavior in a given 
situation. As such, developing cultural self-awareness, 
i.e., becoming "functionally aware," should be a continual 
conscious endeavor toward the integration of three levels of 
communication skills: cognitive, affective, and behavioral. 
Benefits of Cultural Self-Awareness Probably the most 
valuable asset we can gain from increased cultural self-
awareness is enhanced objectivity in intercultural perspec-
tive, i.e., "objectivity in appraising ourselves as well as 
in evaluating our counterparts" (Samovar et al., 1981, pp. 
62-63). Among the reasons: 1) Understanding of the degree 
to which our perceptions and our behaviors are culturally 
conditioned allows us to diagnose difficulties in intercul-
tural communication "from the point of view of discovering 
what cultural aspects of our own thinking may have caused the 
difficulty," which in turn predisposes us to observe the 
communication behavior of people from other cultures in their 
contexts, not in our own. 
2) The knowledge acquired by understanding our own cul-
tural patterns (i.e., the knowledge of conceptualiza-
tion or categorization of cultural patterns) provides 
us with "a perspective or a frame of reference for 
identifying cultural similarities and cultural differ-
ences between ourselves and others involved in an inter-
cul tural encounter." 
3) Increased cultural self-awareness leads to "greater 
awareness of our ignorance of other cultures and a 
corresponding increase in motivation to learn more 
about them." Many of the misunderstandings and the 
difficulties in intercultural (or any type of) communi-
cation often stem from our simple ignorance of the other 
(culture) as well as of ourselves. 
For all these reasons awareness of our own culture 
serves as an essential stepping stone toward awareness 
of other cultures. 
Awareness of Other Cultures; Ethnocentric Awareness 
Perception Cultural difference is natural and in-
trinsic. Yet, we are so accustomed to our own perception 
of reality that we often find ourselves facing a mental 
block against accepting different but, equally valid 
patterns of thought and perception in other cultures. A 
part of the reason is that our psychological mechanisms 
are programmed to act on the defensive against any de-
viation that is incongruent with our identity so as to 
maintain a certain internal consistency. 
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The implied problems here is that our perceptions about 
other people or other cultures are largely our subjective 
images (screened out and colored by our own assumptions 
and values) of those people or those cultures. In its 
simplest sense perception is understood as a combination 
of two fundamental internal operations: the physical 
(organizing stimuli) and the psychological (interpreting 
data) dimensions (Samovar et al., 1981, p. 109). In 
short, perception is a creation of "internal mental 
images" out of the external stimulation. The outcome 
of perceptual process is, thus, much more influenced by 
our psychological dimension, the basic framework of which 
is provided by culture, than by the capacity of our 
physical apparatus. As such, distortion of our percep-
tion of reality and negative stereotyping occur when our 
experience does not fit into our categories of meaning, 
thus being forced into an inaccurate category to somehow 
eliminate ambiguity and uncertainty (Hoopes, 1979, p. 15). 
Ethnocentrism Ethnocentrism is defined as "the ten-
dency to interpret or judge all other groups, their 
environments, and their communication, according to the 
categories and values of one's own culture" (Ruhly, 1976, p. 
22) with its implicit assumption of the supremacy and univer-
sality of one's own culture. Consequently, it ignores 
or disvalues the importance of culturally different 
views of the world in one way or another. 
The most sensitive aspect of ethnocentrism lies in 
very pervasive human emotionality in the sense that 
one's cultural identity is a significant part of one's 
self-concept and self image. In Katz's (1971) words, 
"national identity ... is an anchoring frame for the in-
dividual's conception of himself" (p. 424). The social-
zation process includes the development of an individual's . 
"self-identity not only as a unique personality but as an 
individual belonging to an in-group showing the same 
values and orientations in contrast to foreign out-group" 
(Katz, 1971, p. 424). In this respect one can argue that 
the socialization process is the one where a society en-
courages its members to be ethnocentric for its own sur-
vival and stability. This is one of the reasons why 
cultural sensitivity is so important in any intercul-
tural transaction. 
Intercultural learning (the learning of other cul-
tures) suggested by Hoopes (1979), for instance, goes 
through a progression of seven stages on the learning 
continuum with ethnocentric awareness as a starting 
point: ethnocentrism -- awareness (an awareness of other 
cultures) -- understanding -- acceptance/respect -- appre-
ciation/valuing -- selective adoption -- assimilation/ 
adaptation/biculturalism/multiculturalism (p. 18). This 
basic notion is shared by Bennett's (1984) "Developmental 
models of intercultural sensitivity" that demonstrates 
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various processes of a learner's acquisition of inter-
cultural sensitivity. By "intercultural sensitivity" 
Bennett (1984) means "a person's perceptual relationships 
to cultural difference" (p. 5). The model describes the 
developmental states from the ethnocentric states (de-
nial, defense, minimization) to the "ethnorelative" 
states (acceptance, adaptation, integration) with sub-
divided stages of development within each state. 
All varieties in ethnocentric (and ethnorelative) 
states in Bennett's (1984) model may be found among 
people in any one single culture or even within an 
individual with change in his/her perception of cul-
tural difference. 
To summarize (pp. 9-30): 
I. Denial 
denial of the existence of cultural differ-
ence 
the most naive and parochial position 
" ... a purely ethnocentric person feels that 
all people in the world share his or her 
beliefs, attitudes, behavioral norms, and 
values." 
A. isolation: lack of a category for cultural 
difference due largely to circum-
ferential physical isolation 
"Cultural difference is not ex-
perienced at all. It simply has 
no meaning." 
B. rejection: "the intentional erection of physical 
or social barrier to create distance 
from cultural difference" (e.g., 




- cultural differences are "overtly acknowledged" 
and yet perceived as "threatening" 
- " ... strategies are now sought to fight the 
differences directly in an effort to preserve 
the absoluteness of one's view." 
A. denigration: "negative stereotyping" i,e., nega-
tive evaluation of difference in 
race, religion, age, gender, etc. 
B. superiority: "the positive evaluation of one's 
own cultural status, not the overt 
denigration of other groups" (e.g., 
black pride, and some manifesta-
tion of nationalism) 
C. reversal: "a denigration of one's own culture 
and an attendant assumption of 
superiority of a different culture" 
III. Minimization 
cultural difference is "overtly acknowledge" 
and "not negatively evaluated", however, 
cultural difference is "trivialized" under 
the weight of cultural similarities. 
A. physical universalism: " ... human being in all 
cultures have physical characteris-
tics in common that dictate be-
havior which is basically under-
standable to any other human being." 
B. transcendent universalism: "· .. all human beings, 
whether they know it or not, are 
products of some single trans-
cendent principle, law, or impera-
tive" (e.g., religion, the Marxist 
notion of historical imperative). 
Japanese Ethnocentrism; Its Historic Changes If any 
generalization is allowed about ethnocentrism found among 
Japanese and Americans, it appears that typical Japanese 
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ethnocentrism takes the form of "polycentric ethnocentrism," 
whereas typical American ethnocentrism is operating in the 
direction of "minimization" (minimizing the importance of 
difference, Bennett, 1984) due largely to the pervasiveness 
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of American culture reinforced by the nation's linguistic, 
economic and military super power in international affairs. 
The term "polycentrism" refers to the state where one "is 
overwhelmed by the difference, real and imaginary, great and 
small, between its many operating environments" (Thorelli, 
1966, p. 5). In such a state cultural difference is "overtly 
acknowledged," and yet perceived as "threatening," which is 
characteristic of the "defense" state in the aforementioned 
Bennett's (1984) model. (Implications of these differ-
ing forms of ethnocentrism for cultural adaptability in 
international business will be discussed in detail in 
chapter VI.) 
For a number of reasons Japan as a nation seems to 
have been caught up in very ambivalent foreign and cul-
tural consciousness. Environmentally, on the one hand, 
Japan is most likely to be subject to "isolation" (i.e., 
cultural difference is not experienced at all) due to 
the almost complete racial homogeniety and the geogra-
phical isolation as islands. But on the other hand, a 
small country with virtually no natural resources re-
quired by modern industry is forced to be totally de-
pendent upon import~d energy for its survival, thereby 
fostering a strong sense of helplessness or vulnerability 
deep inside (although since the first and second oil crises 
energy-conservation along with the development of alter-
native energy such as nuclear energy has been promoted). 
Historically, although Japan had formed the foundation of 
its own culture under the heavy influence of Chinese cul-
ture, contacts with China were interrupted by the end of 
the 9th century. During the Tokugawa Shogunnate (1603-
1867) the Government overtly practiced "rejection" 
(keeping distance from foreigners) by embarking on an 
isolation policy (1639-1853). This was a drastic de-
fensive strategy against a potential threat of Western 
colonialism due to a steady increase in the numbers of 
converted Christians in the country. "Denigration" 
(negative stereotyping) of European missionaries was 
employed to justify the policy. It resulted in the ex-
pulsion of all foreigners except for a handful of Dutch 
and Chinese "traders" confined to the small island of 
Dejima at Nagasaki, by whom the Government was, in fact, 
kept informed, if not fully, on what was going on in the 
West. However, the Meiji Restoration of 1868, in turn, 
triggered an extreme "reversal" phenomenon (Western 
cultures are superior to all others) that propelled the 
nation's radical and instant "catch-up" modernization 
during the era. But the "reversal" was soon replaced by 
"superiority" with the advent of imperialism that led to 
war with China (1894-1895) and Russia (1904-1905), and 
further military aggression eventuated in plunging the 
country into the Pacific War (1941-1945) in vain. As a 
consequence of the surrender to the Allied Powers in 
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1945, the pendulum swung back once again from "superior" 
to "reversal" as may have been expected (for Japan, the 
process of modernization was always a process of West-
ernization). At present, when already 41 years have 
passed since the end of World War II, it would seem that 
the deep-rooted "reversal" complex, along with the "re-
jection" residues, is somewhat being balanced with 
the resurgence of confidence and cultural pride backed 
by the nation's remarkable postwar economic recovery 
that built the world's second-largest industrial 
economy. However, on the other hand, some Japanese are 
beginning to be concerned about the growing Japanese 
arrogance observed both at home and abroad (e.g.' 
Kunihiro, 1984, PP· 41-51 ; Hara, 1984, PP· 30-33; 
Hiraiwa and Okawara, 1985, PP· 8-9). Prime minister 
Nakasone's recent (September, 1986) racist remarks on 
minorities in the United States (minorities lowered 
the literacy level in the United States) would be one 
of the worst possible examples of Japan's present 
leader's "big-power chauvinism,'' (Kunihiro, 1984) which, 
in fact, revealed the low level of his own international 
sensitivity and perspective. In his article Kunihiro 
(1984) had already castigated Nakasone for his inter-
national insensitivity and his "narrow nationalism of a 
homogenous race," i.e., "racial homogeneity as a source of 
superiority." 
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Basically, superiority complex and inferiority 
complex are synonymous in the sense that both are the 
products of fear or insecurity. Considering the 
nature of past U.S.-Japan relationships, the growing 
arrogance exhibited by some Japanese toward the United 
States could be a repercussion of their deep-rooted in-
feriority complex toward the United States, which is 
like the bursting of a dam behind which has accumulated 
frustration of a century. On the other hand, however, 
there also could be a possibility that in some cases 
increasing assertiveness (not only economically but also 
verbally) on the part of a good old "teacher's pet" is 
perceived as extremely arrogant by some Americans. 
In general, the Japanese are so conscious and per-
haps so overly cautious of cultural difference that they 
are, in fact, imprisoned in their own paranoiac ethno-
centric frame. It is associated with their latent xeno-
phobia, which has rendered Japan as homogenous as it is 
today, and their pessimistic conviction of the uniqueness 
of Japanese culture that non-Japanese can never comprehend 
1 
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Japanese culture. Xenophobia is based on a fear of losing 
one's own cultural identity. Despite the fact that over 
1 
This obviously forms a striking contrast to the 
basic fabric of American society and to typical American 
ethnocentrism, i.e., American values are universal. How-
ever, there also seems to be quite a number of Japanese 
who confuse internationalization with Americanization. 
the centuries the Japanese have shown an enormous appetite 
and a unique aptitude for assimilating elements of foreign 
cultures, their acquaintance with foreign cultures has 
never really centered on the most direct form of face-to-
face interaction with people of other cultures. Suzuki 
(1985) explains: 
Throughout history the medium of almost all 
Japan's contact with other cultures has been 
documents and objects rather than personal inter-
action. The Japanese have very little experience 
of the most direct form of cultural contact, con-
frontation with people of other cultures in the 
course of daily life .... the Japanese never 
developed the strong sense of identity character-
istic of continental peoples, whose countries are 
contiguous to other countries. (p. 84) 
Consequences of Japanese Ethnocentrism The most 
damaging consequences of Japanese ethnocentrism for the 
Japanese themselves are manifested in "an extreme imbalance 
in the flow of information and opinion, with a heavy flow 
into Japan but almost no flow the other way," which has 
exacerbated frustration and tensions arising from trade 
friction with other nations (Takashina, 1985, p. 78). The 
Japanese are zealous in exporting products, which have 
penetrated all over the world, but make little effort to 
export information about themselves, their values and 
premises to the rest of the world. A few factors serve to 
explain the situation. First of all, it is attributable 
to Japanese parochialism. As has already been discussed, 
historically, Japan has always been overwhelmingly an 
importer of foreign cultures in order to catch up with 
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advanced nations. In ancient times China was an absolute 
teaching model for Japan; so have been Western countries 
since the Meiji Restoration of 1868. In other words, 
Japan has never been in a position to commit itself to 
fulfill its full international responsibilities as a 
major power. Culturally, dread of confrontation and dis-
taste for explicit verbalization result in their apparent 
lack of verbal skills in international contexts, even if 
those traits are valued and work perfectly in the Japanese 
2 
context. 
Awareness of Cultural Value Conflict 
In general, the effectiveness of communication de-
pends largely upon similarities between communicators. 
Yet in intercultural contexts similarities cannot be 
relied on. Thus, the key to effective intercultural 
communication is not to expend most of our energies in 
the direction of assuming similarities, but to identify 
and deal with our incompatibilities by creating some 
commonalities between ourselves and others. Differ-
ences and similarities can be identified in such cate-
gories as 1) cultural assumptions and values (basic 
conceptualizations of the self, family, society, and the 
2 
There are also a few other obstacles that impede 
Japan from disseminating information to the rest of the 
world: the Japanese language as a language in isolation 
and the Japanese people's negative attitude toward their 
own language (Suzuki, 1985, pp. 79-84). 
universe), 2) patterns of thought (inductive vs. deduct-
ive, linear vs. circular), and 3) communication styles 
(verbal and nonverbal processes, including such concepts 
as time and space). For the purposes of this study 
some of the cultural value discrepancies between the 
United States and Japan have already been discussed in 
the previous chapter. Now, a question is: How to deal 
with differences, which is the main focus of the next 
section. 
EMPATHY 
Empathy and Sympathy 
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The philosophical assumption essential to empathy is 
"multiple-reality" (the relativity of frame of reference). 
It is based on the assumption of perceptual variance; 
what is perceived is not the same for all people. The 
alternative to this stance is the assumption of simila-
rity (similarity in our perceptions, given similar cir-
cumstances), on which sympathy is based. 
The term empathy is contrasted to sympathy and 
defined as "the imaginative intellectual and emotional 
participation in another person's experience," while 
sympathy is "the imaginative placing of ourselves in 
another person's position" (Bennett, 1979). 
In empathy, we "participate" rather than 
"place," and we are concerned with "ex-
perience" rather than "position." Placing 
ourselves in another person's position 
assumes essential similarity of experience 
with the other, making it sufficient to 
merely change places with him or her. In 
contrast, participation in another's expe-
rience does not assume essential similari-
ty. The other's experience might be quite 
alien, even if his or her position is simi-
lar. Thus, we need to do more than merely 
change places, or stand in the other per-
son's shoes. We need to get inside the 
head and heart of the other, to participate 
in his or her experience as if we were 
really the other person. (Bennett, 1979, p. 
418) 
Bennett (1984) identified the difference between sympathy 
and empathy as the difference between "a shift in assumed 
circumstance" (where one imagines how one's self would 
feel in another person's position) and "a shift in the 
frame of reference" (where one temporarily suspends 
one's own world view in order to experience another), 
thereby sympathy can be seen as ethnocentric, whereas 
empathy is ethnorelative (p. 42). In this respect, 
sympathy could be egoistic even with the best of in-
tentions, whereas empathy is altruistic to the extent 
that it is exercised constructively for beneficial 
purposes, not for unethical manipulation. 
However, "there is nothing intrinsically 'good' 
about empathy" (Bennett, 1979, p. 421 ) . By the same 
token, there is nothing intrinsically bad about sympathy, 
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either. Sympathy is "easy," "credible," "often accurate," 
and "may be comforting" (Bennett, 1979, pp. 413-414). 
Yet, "in the face of difference" a sympathetic approach 
does not practically work. it can work best only with 
extremely similar people with truly similar experiences. 
Again, the assumption that underlies sympathy is that 
"all people are basically the same; thus other people 
want to be treated in the same way we would like." In 
the face of difference, however, it is so "patronizing" 
that it could even risk leading to misattribution of 
motives. To provide a specific example: 
The Japanese, with the best of motives, 
wants to show kindness or respect to the 
visiting American. So he showers him with 
attention, plans his itinerary, escorts 
him to every attraction, supervises each 
photograph, selects a menu for him, chooses 
his souvenirs, and honors him with farewell 
gifts. The intent is constructive, but the 
American may interpret this as "coercive 
hospitality" at best, or at worst as "damned 
interference." He may appreciate the mo-
tive, but prefers to select his own iti-
nerary, move at his own pace, choose his own 
restaurant, and spontaneously change plans 
according to his mood at the moment. After 
exhaustion has taken over he may feel more 
anger than gratitude for the "hospitality" 
he received. (Barnlund, 1975, p. 42) 
Given the fact that culture is the major supplier 
of values and beliefs, it is highly unlikely that people 
from different cultures share truely similar perceptual 
frames of reference. It is, therefore, a safe and more 
realistic assumption that the reality we experience may 
not be the same reality being expressed by a person 
from another (or even in the same) culture. In inter-
cultural communication where difference is inevitably 
encountered, the key is the ability to shift cultural 
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frames of reference when and where necessary, that is 
empathy. 
Developing Empathic Skills 
In order for empathy to occur successfully in inter-
cul tural contexts several preconditions need to be con-
sidered: 
1) a sincere desire for effective communication across 
cultural boundaries; 
2) appreciation of cultural differences and a willingness 
to make a conscious effort to manage differences; 
3) a sufficient knowledge and understanding of cultural 
factors subject to perceptual variance (as for business 
negotiation implications, in addition to culture-specific 
negotiation and management styles, company-specific nego-
tiation styles need to be taken into account); and 
4) sufficient flexibility that disallows stereotypes from 
interfering with judgment. 
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Specifically, empathic skills can be developed 
systematically by following six steps suggested by Bennett 
(1979, pp. 419-421): assuming difference -- knowing self --
suspending self -- allowing guided imagination -- allowing 
empathic experience -- reestablishing self. 
Developing empathic skills assists us not only in 
becoming more sensitized to the values and needs of other 
people but also in reexamining our own values and expec-
tations. If empathy is exercised mutually, and that 
accompanied by mutual feedback from time to time, the 
accuracy and effectiveness of empathy will be greatly 
enhanced. (Conversely, without feedback empathy could 
be a mere guessing game.) 
ETHNORELATIVISM 
Definition 
Ethnorelativism is a term coined by Bennett (1984) 
asn an appropriate opposite to ethnocentrism. It can be 
considered synonymous with the term cultural relativism 
in the following views: 
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1) "Culture can only be understood relative to one another." 
2) "There is no absolute standard of 'rightness' or 'good-
ness' that can be applied to cultural behavior." 
3) "Cultural difference is neither good nor bad, it is just 
different," thus, the position does "not imply an ethical 
'agreement' with all difference nor a disapproval of stating 
(and acting upon) a preference for one world view over 
another" as long as it is "made on grounds other than the 
ethnocentric protection of one's own world view or in the 
name of absolute (true) principles" (p. 31). 
An important point to note is that a substantial 
change in "the meaning attributed to difference" occurs 
in the ethnorelative states. Unlike in the ethnocentric 
states where cultural difference is experienced as 
"threatening" (either explicitly or implicitly), the 
ethnorelative experience of difference is "nonthreaten-
ing," rather "enjoyable." Cultural difference is "both 
acknowledged and respected," yet "rather than being 
evaluated negatively nor positively as a part of a de-
fensive strategy, the existence of difference is accepted 
as a necessary and preferable human condition" (Bennett, 
1984, p. 33). Basically it is a nonevaluative, sober 
attitude toward difference which is taken as a matter of 
course in life. 
Ethnorelative States and Their Stages 
The ethnorelative states consist of a progression 
of three states with two stages of development within 
each state: acceptance (behavioral relativism, value 
relativism); adaptation (empathy, pluralism); and in-
tegration (contextual evaluation, constructive margin-
ality). In a state of acceptance value difference is 
understood "in a processual con text" (Bennett, 1 984, 
pp. 37-38). That is, valuing (or culture itself) is 
seen as a process of reality construct with both great 
external variation and internal variability rather 
than being reified into values that are perceived as 
"things" intrinsic to one's identity. Therefore, 
"other cultures" different valuing is worthy of re-
spect, not censure." Cultural variation in values and 




(It is associated with cultural self-aware-
The adaptation state of intercultural sensitivity is 
characterized by "the emergence of ability to use accep-
tance of cultural difference for relating and communi-
cating with people of other cultures" (Bennett, 1984, 
p. 40). By adaptation Bennett means the ability to 
"shift" cultural frame of reference for the purpose of 
effective communication, and it should not be confused 
with assimilation that implies absorption into a new 
culture. Thus, it allows for shifting back into one's 
own cultural frame of reference, which has been tem-
porarily suspended for the purpose of communication 
with people of other cultures. In other words, in the 
empathy stage of adaptation "such shifts are intentional 
and temporary." In pluralism, a more advanced stage of 
adaptation, however, "the shifts may be more uninten-
tional and tied to permanent frames of reference" ("the 
existence of two or more internalized cultural reference" 
is characteristic of all pluralism) (Bennett, p. 41). 
As such, experience of difference in the stage of em-
pathy is more limited than in the stage of pluralism 
in that "a different world view is still 'outside' 
self before and after the act of empathy" (Bennett, 
P· 46). Yet pluralism itself also has possible limi-
tations -- "nongeneralizability and nonprocessual 
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orientation" (Bennett, p. 48) unless accompanied by "a 
conscious assumption of ethnorelativism." In other words, 
multiple frames of reference in such nondevelopmental 
pluralism lack an awareness of systematic development 
of cultural sensitivity. They are more a simple collec-
tion of multiple cultural perspectives with which one 
can identify, but which one is unable to extend into 
the general adaptation to cultural difference beyond the 
cultural spheres one is familiar with. 
In the state of integration, the final state of 
ethnorelativism suggested by Bennett (1984), the person 
is not only pluralistic (sensitive to many different 
cultures) but also capable of incorporating difference 
as an integral part of his ever evolving identity process 
free from any particular cultural constraints. This 
type of person is what Adler (1982) calls "multicultural 
man." His essential identity is inclusive of life 
patterns different from his own and who has psychologi-
cally and socially come to grips with multiplicity of 
realities" (p. 390). A key ingredient in such multi-
cultural mentality seems to be a strong motive for self-
reconstruct (or self-expansion) toward a new identify. 
It is accompanied by a thirst for knowledge and per-
petual psychological quests as well as great flexibi-
lity and tolerance for ambiguity. Adler (1982, pp. 
394-396) described the multicultural identity as 
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follows: 
1) The multicultural person is psychologi-
cally adaptive .... The multicultural 
identity is premised, not on the hier-
archical structuring of a single mental 
image but rather on the intentional and 
accidental shifts that life's experi-
ences involve. 
2) The multicultural person is ever under-
going personal transitions. He moves 
through one experience of self to 
another, incorporating here, discard-
ing there, responding dynamically and 
situationally. 
3) Multicultural man maintains indefinite 
boundaries of the self. The parameters 
of his identity are neither fixed nor 
predictable, being responsive, instead, 
to both temporary form and openness to 
change. 
4) No culture is capable of imprinting or 
ingraining the identity of multicultural 
man indelibly; yet, likewise, multicul-
tural man must rely heavily on cultures 
to maintain his own relativity. 
Hence, implied by such multicultural identity is "the 
ability to analyze and evaluate situations from one or 
more chosen cultural perspectives" -- "contextual eval-
uation" (Bennett, 1984, p. 52). However, several po-
tential pitfalls are also associated with such dyna-
mism (Adler, 1982, pp. 400-402): 
1) multicultural man is vulnerable; 
2) multicultural man can easily become 
multiphrenic ("diffused identity"); 
3) multicultural man can very easily 
suffer from a loss of the sense of 
his own authenticity; 
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4) multicultural man can very easily move 
from identity experience to identity 
experience without commiting himself 
or his values to real-life situations; 
5) the multicultural person may take ulti-
mate psychological refuge in an attitude 
of existential absurdity, mocking the 
patterns and lifestyles of others who 
are different from himself, reacting, 
at best in a detached and aloof way, 
and at worst as a nihilist who sees 
negation as a salvation for himself and 
others. 
Adler, however, pointed out that these "stresses and 
strains" are basically different in nature from the ten-
sions and anxieties usually associated with cross-cul-
tural adjustment as seen in culture shock. A possible 
explanation for this in terms of the nature of identity 
would seem that culture shock may be caused by the clash 
of conflicting cultural identity patterns while one has 
had a relatively stable form of self process. Psycho-
cultural dynamism and marginality characteristics of 
the multicultural person are two sides of the multicul-
tural identity coin. A fluidity of self (or marginal-
ity) may give rise to stresses and strains; those ten-
sions are the very basis of the dynamics of the multi-
cultural style of identity. Yet, as Adler also says, 
the multicultural person does not necessarily have to 
entertain all those difficulties. In fact, when mar-
ginality is consciously used as "a constructive force" 
based on the awareness of marginality as "a natural out-
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growth of highly developed sensitivity to cultural 
relativity," it becomes what Bennett (1984) calls "con-
structive marginality" that "can be the most powerful 
position from which to exercise intercultural sensi-
tivity" (p. 57). 
THE APPLICABILITY AND USEFULNESS OF AN INTERCULTURAL 
PERSPECTIVE IN ENHANCING NEGOTIATING SKILLS 
The Assumption of Perceptual Variance 
101 
As obvious from the literature review on the concepts 
of intercultural communication principles in the previous 
section, an intercultural perspective does not simply mean 
a mere awareness of or familiarity with cultural differ-
ences. It is an ability to understand and appreciate the 
reasons for the differences (e.g. the underlying reasons 
that motivate people to behave in a certain way). It is 
a person's "nonthreatening," "nonevaluating," and rather 
positive perceptual relationship to differences ("ethno-
relativism"). Associated with this trait are self-aware-
ness, mental flexibility, tolerance of ambiguity, em-
pathy if not more sophisticated "contextual evaluation" 
i.e., "the ability to analyze and evaluate situations 
from one or more chosen cultural perspectives" (Bennett, 
1984, p. 52), which can be possible by internalization 
of multiple cultural frames of reference. 
Negotiation here again is defined as "a process in 
which two or more parties, who have both common interests 
and conflicting interests, put forth and discuss explicit 
proposals concerning specific terms of a possible agree-
ment" (Ways, 1985, p. 20). 
102 
The assumption of perceptual variance -- what is per-
ceived is not the same for all people -- plays an important 
role in the negotiation process for the following reasons: 
Firstly, it should be acknowledged that perceptual 
and value discrepancies between the parties can become 
major variables affecting the course of the negotiation. 
Perceptual difference, however, has ambivalent effects in 
conflict. On the one hand, it can be a cause of conflict. 
In many cases perceptual differences (differences in 
subjective reality, not in objective reality) generate 
conflicts in the first place. What you perceive to be 
reasonable is not necessarily what the other party per-
ceives to be reasonable, for instance. On the other 
hand, agreement can often be reached because of differ-
ing perceptions between the parties by "dovetailing 
differences" in interests, priorities, beliefs and so 
on (Fisher and Ury, 1983). 
Secondly, empathic skills (or a person's nonevaluat-
ing perceptual relationship to difference) are con-
sidered as a prerequisite to conflict management for the 
following reasons: 
1) Empathic skills allow for objectifying the problem, 
wherein the problem is viewed from a common ground in an 
objective way. For instance, empathy is employed in Lee's 
(1966) four-step cultural analysis in business adaptation 
that is designed to check the influence of self-reference 
criterion (SRC) -- the unconscious reference to one's own 
cultural values: 
Step 1 - Define the business problem or goal 
in terms of the American cultural 
traits, habits, or norms. 
Step 2 - Define the business problem or goal 
in terms of the foreign cultural 
traits, habits, or norms. Make no 
value judgments. 
Step 3 - Isolate the SRC influence in the 
problem and examine it carefully 
to see how it complicates the prob 
lem. 
Step 4 - Redefine the problem without the SRC 
influence and solve for the optimum 
business goal situation. (p. 110) 
However, there are some people who tend to interpret em-
pathy mainly from the emotional side of it and argue the 
costs of empathy in the negotiation process, that is, the 
costs of oversensitivity and excessive reactiveness to 
the other's needs and wants in the negotiating outcomes 
(e.g., Kelle and Schenitzki, 1972; Rubin, 1983; Raven and 
Rubin, 1985). Moreover, a number of studies on the impact 
of the bilateral focus perspective (role reversal) vs. 
self-representation in simulated debates show that 
"bilateral presentation per se did not lead to more 
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frequent attainment over self-representation" (Lewicki 
and Litterer, 1985, p. 287). Yet this is due to the 
fundamental function of bilateral focus or empathy, 
which is to uncover the goals of both parties, i.e., 
to reveal whether or not actual compatibilities in 
objectives exist between the parties. According to 
Lewicki and Litterer (1985), only under the following 
circumstances did role reversal tend to enhance object-
ive understanding of the other position: 
1. The role reversers performed well, that is, they were 
skillful effective role reversers. 
2. The positions they were advocating were actually com-
patible. Bilateral focus did not increase agreements 
when the negotiators' positions were actually in-
compatible. When positions are incompatible, bi-
lateral focus may serve to sharpen the areas of 
incompatibility and inhibit progress rather than 
promote it. 
3. One party actively proposed compromises to reconcile 
any incompatibilities that may be recognized.(p. 287) 
Thus, Lewicki and Litterer (1985) say, " ... if the use 
of bilateral focus reveals that the parties' goals are 
actually incompatible, integral bargaining is impossible, 
and the sooner that is discovered, the better" (p. 288). 
In short, empathy should be an operational tool for the 
need of objectivity in negotiation. 
2) Conflict (or difference) needs to be viewed as a 
natural and a more necessary condition to creative solu-
tions; in other words, a creative decision benefits from 
the differing points of views and strengths of each -
the dynamics of competition and collaboration (a win-win 
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situation). In his painstaking review of conflict litera-
ture Thomas (1976) observed an emergence of a more gen-
eral recognition of positive effects of conflict in the 
United States. A balanced view of conflict recognizes 
that "conflict itself is no evil but rather a phenomenon 
which can have constructive or destructive effects depend-
ing upon its management" (p. 889). The emphasis has 
shifted from the elimination of conflict to management of 
conflict over the past thirty years. Thomas (1976) notes 
some recurrent themes in discussion of positive effects 
of conflict as follows: 
- A moderated degree of conflict may not 
necessarily be viewed as a cost by the 
parties involved; 
- The confrontation of divergent views 
often produces ideas of superior quality; 
- Aggressive behavior in conflict situations 
is not necessarily irrational or destruc-
tive (suppression of conflict may have the 
effect of impeding progress and maintain-
ing the status quo). (pp. 891-892) 
Needless to say, those views are culture-bound. They are 
American views of conflict and its management. Yet given 
the improbability of complete elimination of conflict in 
human interaction, it appears that the essence of the 
argument -- the importance of viewing differences as posi-
tive diversity -- has universal validity even if conflict 
may or should be managed in a culturally determined way 
in a given cultural context. 
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Synergistic Conflict Resolution 
One of the crucial negotiation skills suggested by 
Stepsis (1974) is the ability to determine the nature of 
the conflict, that is, the ability to diagnose "whether 
the conflict is an ideological (value) conflict or 'real' 
(tangible) conflict -- or a combination of both" (p. 140). 
Value conflicts are extremely difficult to negotiate and 
often unnegotiable. Stepsis (1974) explains: 
A difference of values, however, is really 
significant only when our opposing views 
affect as in some real or tangible way. 
If your stand on women's place in society 
results in my being denied a job that I 
want and I am qualified to perform, then 
we have a negotiable conflict. Neither of 
us needs to change his values for us to 
come to a mutually acceptable resolution 
of the "real" problem. For example, I 
may get the job but, in return, agree to 
accept a lower salary or a different title 
or not insist on using the all-male executive 
dining room. If each of us stands on his 
principles -- maintaining our value conflict 
-- we probably will make little headway. But 
if, instead, we concentrate on the tangible 
effects in the conflict, we may be able to 
devise a realistic solution.(p. 140) 
In other words, "focus on interests, not positions" 
(Fisher and Ury, 1983) or focus on "problems rather than 
our demands" (Nierenberg, 1971). It is clear from the 
above example that first of all "our demands are only a 
one-solution approach to the problem" (Nierenberg, 1971, 
p. 12). To put it another way, "for every interest 
there usually exist several possible positions that 
could satisfy it" (Fisher and Ury, 1983, p. 43). Second 
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of all, "as more attention is paid to positions, less 
attention is devoted to meeting the underlying concerns 
of the parties" (Fisher and Ury, 1983, p. 5). However, 
it does not suggest that we should totally ignore 
positions and concentrate only on interests. The impli-
cation is that focus should be on identifying underly-
ing interests of the parties while taking into account 
a specific position of each as a reflection of the 
underlying interests. Neither position needs to be 
given up, although it is possible that in the course 
of a negotiation new circumstances lead to a change in 
the position of one or the other party. 
Intercultural implications of this point are im-
portant. It would be almost impossible to resolve any 
international conflict if the negotiation centers a-
round the argument over the fundamental ideological 
differences between the parties, and not directed to-
ward resolution-seeking endeavors for mutual gains if 
and whenever possible. The essence of intercultural 
communication principles is a creation of common mean-
ing between the differing cultural entities. Based on 
the appreciation of cultural difference, commonality 
is established by both promoting shared meaning and re-
solving conflicting one. What should be dealt with, 
however, is not cultural difference per se, which exists 
for good reasons, but the problems caused by the effects 
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of difference on communication behavior of the people 
involved. 
The following definitions of cultural synergy by 
Moran and Harris (1982, p. 5) may serve to explain the 
nature of integrative bargaining -- a win-win approach 
to negotiation - Lewicki and Litterer, 1985): 
1. It represents a dynamic process. 
2. It involves two, often opposing views. 
3. It involves empathy and sensitivity. 
4. It means interpreting signals sent by others. 
5. It involves adapting and learning. 
6. It means combined action and working together. 
7. Synergy involves joint action of discrete agencies 
in which the total effects greater than the sum of 
their effects when acting independently. 
8. It has the goal of creating an integrated solution. 
9. It is sometimes related by the analogy that 2 + 2 = 5 
instead of 4, but given the various cross-cultural 
barriers, cultural synergy may be the equation 
2 + 2 = 3. If the cultural synergy sum is not 
negative, progress has been made. 
10. For two prospective synergists to synergize effective-
ly, true and complete understanding of the other or-
ganization and especially of the culture is necessary. 
11. Cultural synergy does not signify compromise, yet in 
true synergy nothing is given up or lost. 
12. Cultural synergy is not something people do, rather 
it is something that happens while people are doing 
something else that often has little to do with 
culture. 
13. Cultural synergy exists only in relation to a prac-
tical set of circumstances and it takes place by 
necessity when two or possibly more culturally 
different groups come to the mutual conclusion that 
they need to unite their efforts in order to achieve 
their respective goals. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
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In this Chapter based on cultural awareness the useful-
ness and applicability of an intercultural perspective in 
business negotiation was discussed. However, in real-life 
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business negotiation situations, a mere awareness or recogni-
tion of the usefulness of an intercultural perspective is 
not necessarily sufficient to motivate people to act it out. 
There are many factors affecting the use of an intercultural 
perspective. The following chapter will examine some of the 
factors affecting the use of an intercultural perspective in 
cross-cultural business negotiation. Some specific examples 
of cultural synergy in negotiation will also be discussed. 
CHAPTER V 
ANALYSIS OF THE FACTORS AFFECTING THE USE OF AN INTER-
CULTURAL COMMUNICATION PERSPECTIVE IN CROSS-CULTURAL 
BUSINESS NEGOTIATION 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter we shall explore some of the factors 
affecting the use of an intercultural perspective in cross-
cultural business negotiation and the degree to which they 
are manifested in U.S.- Japan business negotiation (re-
search question #4). While there are many such factors, 
the discussion will be concerned with two interrelated 
factors -- motives and power relations between parties. 
The chapter consists of five main sections: the 
assumption; the approach; motives; power relations; 
and cultural accommodation as negotiating power. 
Although findings and theory to be presented are sketchy, 
two of the U.S.-Japan business negotiations case studies 
(from the literature review) will be used to demonstrate, 
first, the impact of motives and power relations between 
parties on the degree of their cultural accommodation in 
two opposite contexts, and second, conversely, the im-
pact of parties' cultural accommodation on their nego-
tiating power. While power in the first case refers to 
the one shaped by environmental conditions, power in 
the second case means strategic negotiating power. 
The section of "power relations," however, will 
address a rather general discussion of the impact of 
U.S.-Japan power relations on cultural adaptability of 
the two cultural groups. Specifically the discussion 
will center around the question of why in general the 
Japanese tend to be more willing to accommodate them-
selves to cultural differences than their American 
counterparts in their interaction. A feasible reason 
would be: "the reality of living with Western domination" 
(Yamazaki, 1986, p. 59). 
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THE ASSUMPTION 
Two issues are of importance here that affect the 
use of an intercultural communication perspective in 
cross-cultural business negotiation. The first one 
is "motives to cooperate" (Tung, 1984, p. 115) that lead 
to the entry decision and commitment. The second one 
deals with power, i.e., the ability to influence 
favorably the decision of others. The main assumption 
here is that the degree of a willingness (or unwilling-
ness) to use an intercultural perspective in cross-
cultural business negotiation often has more to do with 
the impact of the motives and power relations between 
the parties involved on their negotiating behavior than 
with the recognition of the importance of bridging cul-
tural gaps per se. In other words, motives to cooperate 
and power relations of the parties tend to dictate who 
accommodates behavior more, thus who is more willing to 
use an intercultural communication perspective in cross-
cultural business negotiation. 
A willingness to use an intercultural communication 
perspective has three aspects: 1) a willingness to under-
stand cultural differences (cognitive); 2) a willingness 
to appreciate cultural differences as a viable alterna-
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tive (affective); and 3) a willingness to engage in inter-
culturally appropriate behavior (behavioral). While in 
the previous two chapters we have emphasized the cognitive 
and affective aspects, what we are concerned with here is 
the behavioral aspect. A willingness to understand or 
appreciate cultural differences does not necessarily go 
hand in hand with a willingness to act out interculturally 
appropriate patterns of behavior. Cultural adaptation 
demands motivation. While there are a number of condi-
tions that produce motivation, attention will be re-
stricted to motives (some specific factors, e.g., in-
centives) to cooperate and power relations of the parties 
in business negotiation situations. 
THE APPROACH 
Basically the approach this study employs (not only 
this particular chapter but this entire paper) falls 
into a category which Thomas (1976) calls a "structural 
model" of conflict. Thomas synthesized two general 
models of conflict from his extensive literature review 
on conflict and conflict management -- a process model 
and a structural model (pp. 892-894): 
Process model: - focuses on the internal dyna-
mics of conflict episodes; 
- the objective is to identify 
the events within an episode 
such as the frustration of one 
party, his behavior, the re-
action of the other party and 
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the final agreement or lack 
of agreement. Having identi-
fied those events, the model 
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is then concerned with in-
fluence of each event upon the 
following events -- for example, 
how does the party's concep-
tualization of the issue influ-
ence his behavior, how does 
his behavior influence the 
other's, and how is the form 
of the final agreement in-
fluenced by their behavior; 
useful for managing an ongoing 
system and helps one cope with 
crises. 
Structural model: - focuses on the conditions 
which shape events; 
- the objective is to identify 
parameters which influence 
conflict behavior, i.e., iden-
tifying the pressures and con-
straints which bear upon the 
parties' behavior -- for exam-
ple, social pressures, per-
sonal predispositions, estab-
lished negotiation procedures 
and rules, incentives, and so 
on. Furthermore, the struc-
tural model attempts to 
specify the effects of these 
conditions upon behavior -
for example, in what way do 
peer pressures influence be-
havior, how does frequency 
of interaction influence con-
flict behavior, and how do 
various personal motives 
shape one's conflict behavior?; 
- helpful in altering variables 
to produce long-run changes 
in conflict-handling behavior 
in a situation. 
Thomas (1976) claims that the two models complement each 
other in that "the structural variables constrain and 
shape the process dynamics, while knowledge of the process 
dynamics helps one predict the effects of structural 
variables" (p. 894). 
While the process model is concerned with a party's 
conceptualization of issues as a determinant of his 
behavior, the structural model is concerned with the 
effects of conditions (e.g., personal predispositions, 
rules, procedures, incentive, organizational norms, con-
stituent pressures, etc.) upon emergent behavior. Cul-
tural values and norms are considered as one such vari-
able shaping ambient social pressure in terms of proper 
conflict behavior. Hence, what we are concerned with here 
is the effect of two particular variables -- motives 
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and power relations between parties -- on their negotiating 
behavior regarding cultural adaptability. 
In fact, the concept of negotiating power involves 
an infinite number of factors about the negotiating pro-
cess. Bases of power, therefore, are identified vari-
ously. For instance, French and Raven (1959) categorized 
power into five factors: reward power, coercive power, 
legitimate power, expert power, and referent power. 
Lewicki and Litterer (1985) added to them the power of 
information as a sixth base. Fisher (1983), on the other 
hand, identified six kinds of power: the power of skill 
and knowledge, the power of a good relationship, the 
power of a good alternative to negotiating, the power 
of an elegant solution, the power of legitimacy, and the 
power of commitment. Moreover, negotiating power between 
parties are subject to change with a constant shift of 
circumstances (both internally and externally) develop-
ing during the course of negotiation. One's negotiating 
power can dissipate easily; the negotiating momentum 
swings from the one side to the other in a moment. How-
ever, our main concern is with negotiating power affected 
by the relatively fixed underlying conditions (socio-
cultural environment), and not with negotiating power 
shaped by the moment-to-moment process of various con-
flict behavior patterns or negotiating strategies and 
tactics, which, however, will be touched on briefly 
regarding the issue of cultural accommodation. 
MOTIVES 
Referring to Kapoor's (1975) study on international 
business negotiation, Tung (1984) claims: 
... to capture the dynamics of an interna-
tional business negotiating situation, it 
is necessary to understand either partner's 
motives to enter into a cooperative agree-
ment. An accurate gauging of the motives 
will assist in the projection of how accom-
modating or non-accommodating a particular 
partner to the negotiation will be. If one 
party needed the agreement badly enough, 
it would bend over backward to meet the 
terms and demands of the other partner. 
(p. 115) 
In other words, if there is strong enough motive, there 
may be a willingness to accommodate in order to attain 
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negotiating objectives. It seems that a willingness to 
accommodate to cultural differences becomes an integral 
part of a whole package of accommodating to the needs of 
the other party. One of the Tung (1984) case studies, . 
which dealt with a joint program in aircraft production 
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between Boeing and the Civil Transport Development 
Corporation (CTDC), a quasi-Japanese government entity, 
shows how accommodating the Japanese could be in indus-
tries where Japan is deficient and which are vital to the 
national interest (pp. 109-129). The Japanese partner was 
very accommodating "not only in the area of terms agreed 
to, .... but also in its willingness to accept the U.S. style 
of confrontation in the negotiation process" (Tung, 1984, 
p. 115). The Kapoor (1975) case study on the Mitsubishi-
Chrysler joint-venture negotiation, on the other hand, 
provides an example of how accommodating and flexible 
Americans could be in adjusting to cultural differences 
as well as in seeking terms in the situation where the 
U.S. company was very anxious to enter the Japanese 
market (pp. 93-152). 
The following are major underlying conditions, in-
cluding motives, behind such accommodating behavior 
of the parties in the two case studies (the conditions 
basically formed a power structure between the parties). 
In the case of the Mitsubishi-Chrysler joint-venture 
negotiations: 
1. The American IC (Chrysler) is smaller than 
the Japanese IC (Mitsubishi) it was nego-
tiating with. 
2. The American company was very anxious to 
enter the Japanese market and therefore 
the terms of entry it could seek were 
different than if it were negotiating 
with a venture in developing countries, 
which generally seek foreign investment. 
3. The necessity of recognizing and meeting 
the requirements of the Japanese govern-
ment in order to gain approval of the 
joint venture required specific skills 
and intimate sensitivities in relation to 
Japanese business-government relations, 
which greatly enhanced the negotiating 
position of the Japanese company vis-a 
vis the American partner. (Kapoor, 1975, 
p. 1 5) 
In contrast, main characteristics of the negotiations for 
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the production of Boeing's 767 between Boeing and CTDC were: 
1 • The Japanese lag considerably behind the 
United States in aircraft technology; 
the role of the Japanese is a partici-
pant, rather than full-fledged partner. 
2. The aerospace industry has been designa-
ted by the Japanese government as a 
growth industry for the rest of the 
twentieth century. CTDC is a quasi-
government agency created under the 
sponsorship of the Japanese govern-
ment, whose working entities are three 
giant multinationals - Mitsubishi 
Heavy Industries, Ltd.; Kawasaki 
Heavy Industries, Ltd.; and Fuji Heavy 
Industries, Ltd. 
3. Because of the unique characteristics 
of the aircraft industry, there is 
virtually no viable route for Japan 
to follow except for joint coopera-
tion with foreign manufacturers. (Tung, 
1984, pp. 109-112) 
The term "accommodating" will be q_ualified in detail 
later with more about these two case studies. But in the 
meantime the following section will shift attention to a 
discussion of a more general and broader impact of struc-
turally influenced power relations between the United 
States and Japan on cultural adaptability of the two 
groups. 
POWER RELATIONS 
In the last section of Chapter III, based on the 
Graham (1981, 1983) studies we discussed the vertical re-
lationship between Japanese buyer and seller as opposed 
to the horizontal relationship between American buyer 
and seller and its implications for U.S.-Japan business 
relations. It was predicted that a Japanese seller coming 
to the U.S. to market his products "naturally assumes 
the lower status position and acts accordingly" (he 
tailors his business and negotiating practices as well 
as his products to fit the needs of the American con-
text); thus a sale is made. On the other hand, an 
American seller who assumes the eq_ual status position 
with his Japanese buyer's tends to be viewed as 
"inappropriate and lacking in respect" (it may be most 
reflected in product adaptation); conseq_uently the sale 
is less probable. 
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This is an example of power relations between 
buyer and seller based on situational constraints and 
their impact on the behavior of the negotiators. 
Different degrees in perceptions of power relations be-
tween Japanese buyer and seller and American buyer and 
seller manifest their impact on the negotiators' be-
havior in different ways. An irony about it in terms 
of cultural adaptability is that the very usage of the 
Japanese way of conducting human interaction in inter-
national businesss coincidently leads the Japanese 
seller to be naturally adaptive to the host country or 
firm he aims at negotiating with. 
Circumstantially, it would seem that the United 
States has been in one of the most disadvantageous posi-
tions to become empathic (but in one of the best positions 
to be sympathetic) toward other nations in the interna-
tional arena, no matter how culturally pluralistic its own 
society is, because of the nation's power in every 
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aspect of the international affairs coupled with the per-
vasiveness of its culture. If there is any truth to the 
statement that the Japanese have usually been the ones who 
are more willing to adjust to cultural difference in over-
all U.S.-Japan relations, it may be probably due to the power 
relations that have existed between the two nations. 
The Reality of Living With Western Domination 
- Our own great American achievement has somehow 
become a positive psychological handicap. The 
United States has been a vast and successful 
working machine for converting into ourselves 
persons from every nation of the world. We 
cannot make ourselves over, even imaginatively, 
into other people .... Our thoughtlessness is 
caught in our assumptions that what we do 
is never chauvinistic or nationalistic, though 
what others do may well be. Thus for British 
missionaries to teach cricket or Canadian 
missionaries to teach lacrosse would be chau-
vinistic, but for American missionaries to 
teach baseball is not spreading American cul-
ture but merely enabling the benighted nations 
to be human beings. (Ong, quoted in Cleveland 
et al . , 1 9 6 0 , p . 1 31 ) 
- Business people on both sides of the Pacific 
have learned to manage ... differences in nego-
tiating styles. The Japanese have been better 
at making adjustments. (Christopher, 1984, p. 
31 ) 
- An important aspect of the Japanese style of 
business negotiation includes adapting bargain-
ing behaviors to those of the host country or 
firm. (Graham and Sano, 1984, p. 17) 
- Most U.S. companies that are international still 
have a basic strategy that is oriented toward 
the American market. They are simply not in-
terested in foreign markets. (an American busi-
ness executive, quoted in Hall and Hall, 1987, 
p. 151) 
In the early years after World War II the United 
States was the provider of technical expertise and Japan 
was its recipient. It is true that the economic relations 
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between the two countries have drastically changed ever 
since. Since the early 1980s Japan's visible (merchandise) 
trade surplus with the United States has grown rapidly and 
totaled about $50 billion in 1987 (Wall Street Journal, Jan. 
6, 1988, p. 14) and it has been adversely affecting U.S.-
Japan economic relations. Moreover because of the con-
tinuing decline of the U.S. dollar's value against the 
yen since 1985 (down 54% from its 1985 heights), which 
could produce a significant improvement in the trade 
gap, Japan's direct investments in the U.S. real estate 
and corporations have been building up very rapidly 
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and reached $23.4 billion at the end of 1986, from just 
$4.7 billion in 1980. 
Furthermore, because of the change in economic re-
lations, a psychological shift in their perceptions of one 
another has been taking place. American business people 
have been showing, for the first time, their serious 
interest in learning Japanese management and business 
practices and reassessing their own systems; Japanese 
people have begun to exhibit their "big-power chauvinism" 
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both at home and abroad (e.g., Kunihiro, 1984, pp. 141-151). 
However, what has not changed and what seems, at least 
to the author, to be likely to remain the underlying 
reason for the Japanese people's willingness to adjust to 
cultural differences in their interaction with Americans 
is this undeniable reality -- "the reality of living with 
Western domination" (Yamazaki, 1986, p. 59). Take a simple 
example: When American and Japanese business people or 
Japan ranked third after Netherland ($42.9 billion) 
and Britain ($51 .4 billion), according to Time, Sept. 14, 
1987' p. 55. --
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politicians meet in Japan, do they bow to each other as a 
form of greeting? Of course, not. They shake hands, 
instead. Yamazaki (1986) explains two basic reasons for what 
he calls "Western domination of world culture": 
1) Western culture has a 400 year history 
of global expansion, beginning with the 
emergence of the European nation-states; 
2) Western culture gave birth to industrial 
society and so became the purveyor of an 
asset of universal value: material wealth. 
(pp. 59-60) 
Thereby Yamazaki goes on to say what internationalization 
for Japan (or any non-Western nations) means: 
First, it must be recognized that the world 
today is the world that was discovered by 
the West from the sixteenth century on. 
Accordingly internationalization for Japan 
means adapting to the Western order. Inter-
nationalization thus involves not a peculiar 
culture adapting itself to a more universal 
culture but rather one set of peculiarities 
adapting themselves to another set. Just 
as "standard" Japanese is not a synthesis 
of diverse dialects but an expanded ver-
sion of a particular Tokyo dialect, so the 
standard language of international relations 
-- both literally and figuratively -- is mere-
ly an extension of Western idiom. (p. 59) 
To almost an amazing degree, Japan has been showing 
an enormous appetite and a unique aptitude for incorporat-
ing elements of "advanced Western cultures into its own in 
order to survive and succeed in the international arena, 
as discussed in the previous chapter. 
However, it must be added that Buddhist fatalism 
("the Buddhist virtue of passive acceptance of destiny, 
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rather than an active modification of it") is considered 
as another reason why the Japanese are inclined to accomo-
date themselves as a virtue to the external realities. 
The word "full" (rather than "sufficient") under-
standing is almost unrealistic in intercultural settings. 
The argument in this section that the Japanese are more 
willing to adjust to cultural difference than their 
American counterparts in their interaction with one 
another is not meant to say that the Japanese have a 
better understanding of what makes the other side of the 
Pacific tick. Rather it is simply to say that the pre-
sumably better cultural accommodation on the part of 
the Japanese, which is confined largely on the exteria, 
is a mere result of their playing by the rules in the 
international community run on Western principles. 
Both Americans and Japanese still have a long way to go 
in even having a "sufficient" understanding of each other's 
cultural premises that influence them differently. Even 
though billions of dollars of business have been trans-
acted between the two countries and no doubt it will con-
tinue to increase in the future, what we are seeing now 
is increased and probably deep-seated mistrust between 
these two countries. (See Japan Echo: vol XI, No. 3, 
1984, pp. 25-33; vol XII, No. 3, 1985, pp. 7-37; vol 
2 
In other words, the value of "man in harmony with 
nature" as opposed to the value of "man dominating nature" 
-- see Table 3.1. and Haglund, 1984, pp. 66-67. 
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XII, No. 4, 1985, pp. 8-26.) But at least both sides are 
talking with each other more than ever. Neither can afford 
not to. Nor can they deny the reality of this powerful 
economic interdependence. 
A recent magazine article, "The Japanese don't know 
who we are" by Lee Iacocca, Chairman of Chrysler Corpora-
tion, provides a good example of how the tension underlying 
and surrounding the trade friction between Japan and the 
United States is intensified, on a very emotional level, by 
a lack of understanding of cultural differences. Journalis-
tic sensationalism that tends to capsulize a part as a whole 
seems to have contributed to evoking much of the Iacocca's 
indignation. But what is interesting here is that both the 
Japanese broadcaster's comment and the Iacocca's reaction to 
it happen to be quite stereotypically representative of 
aforementioned cultural values - "man in harmony with nature" 
vs. "man dominating nature." 
Maybe because I didn't grow up on an island, 
I'll be the first one to admit that I don't 
fully unerstand what motivates the Japanese. 
But that works both ways .... A couple of weeks 
ago I picked up a newspaper article on the 
anti-American feelings that are cropping up 
in Japan lately because of U.S. demands for 
fair trade .... One prominant Japanese tele-
vision commentator, for example, was quoted 
as saying: "We've accepted trade friction 
like changes in the weather -- something 
natural -- and tried to adapt in a passive 
way, as you do against a storm or wind." 
Between those lines I saw exactly the atti-
tude that has caused much of the problem. 
The Japanese aren't serious about changing 
their predatory trade practices. They just 
intend to close the shutters and wait for 
the storm to pass. The attitude has al-
ready convinced many Americans that Japanese 
have to be forced to change, because they'll 
never do it on their own. The storm won't 
blow over. The Japanese don't understand 
Americans or American politics if they be-
lieve that we'll continue to tolerate deficit 
of $5 billion a month forever .... The trade 
conflict between Japan and the United States 
will continue to fester and get worse if we 
don't learn to meet each other halfway, but 
we aren't doing that right now. (This Week, 
July 29, 1987, sec. A, p. 8) 
CULTURAL ACCOMMODATION AS NEGOTIATING POWER 
In the previous sections we discussed the degree 
to which motives and structurally constrained power re-
lations between parties affect their cultural accommoda-
tion. In this final section, however, the focus will be 
turned around onto the impact of cultural accommodation 
on negotiating power. Thus, the term power in this case 
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refers to strategic power. But first, the term "accommoda-
ting" needs to be qualified in relation to another im-
portant term "collaborating'' since the insulated defini-
tion of "accommodating" contradicts our working definition 
of it. 
Defining Accommodating 
In the dual concern model (Figure 2 ) which has its 
origins in Blake and Mouton's (1964) work, five different 
approaches to conflict (different names are sometimes 




















0 Cl) +' 
OJ H 
OJ s OJ 
OJ 0 Cl) 
H c> Cl) 
tlD +' cd 
OJ ;::; s::: 








Degree of Concern for Other Party's Outcomes 
Figure 2. The dual concern model. 
Sources: Thomas, 1976, p. 900.; Pruitt, 1983, 
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are identified on the basis of the degree to which a party 
would like to satisfy his own concern and the degree to 
which a party would like to satisfy the concern of 
the other: competing (contending), accommodating (yield-
ing), compromising (sharing), collaborating (problem 
solving), and avoiding (inaction) (Blake and Mouton, 
1964; Filley, 1975; Thomas 1976; Gladwin and Walter, 1980; 
Rahim, 1983; Pruitt, 1983; Lewicki and Litterer, 1985). 
According to the model, an accommodating orientation 
or strategy focuses on satisfying the other's concerns in-
stead of attending to one's own. Accommodation involves 
cooperation and unassertiveness. The assertiveness of a 
party's orientation or strategy (concern about own out-
comes) is in part a result of the importance of the issues 
to a party or a party's "stakes" in conflict. The notion 
of a party's "stakes" refers to a party's dependence upon 
the other; the more a party depends upon the other, the 
greater are a party's stakes in his relationship with the 
other (Thomas, 1976, pp. 917-918). The cooperativeness 
of a party toward the other (concern about the other 
party's outcomes) is to a large extent "a function of his 
identification with the other that ranges from positive 
identification through indifference to hostility" (Thomas, 
1976, p. 902). Pruitt (1983) argues that there are two 
basic reasons for a negotiator's concern about the other 
party's outcomes: genuine concern (one has an intrinsic 
interest in the other's welfare) and strategic concern 
(one recognizes one's own dependence upon the other there-
by impressing the other with one's concern about his/her 
welfare to obtain one's ends) (pp. 175-176). 
Basically accommodation is assumed to result from 
one's relatively small stake in a relationship where 
there is commonality of interest. When one has a great 
deal at stake in a relationship in which there is con-
siderable commonality of interest, he is expected to en-
gage in collaboration. Thomas (1976) explains: 
With common interest, he can generally 
trust Other's intentions and may lose 
little by deferring to Other's wishes. 
For example, if a researcher is engaged 
in several joint research projects, he 
is likely to devote the least energy to 
the least important of them, relying upon 
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his colleague's judgment and generally 
accommodating his wishes. (p. 922) 
Also, Pruitt's (1983) studies that were designed to test 
predictions from the dual concern model indicate that as 
predicted by the model the highest joint benefit was pro-
duced by active problem solving behavior (high concern 
about own outcomes and high concern about the other's out-
comes); the contending (high concern about own outcomes 
and lower concern about the other's outcomes) produced 
moderately low joint benefit; and a combination of low 
concern about own outcomes and high concern about the 
other's outcomes, i.e., the yielding, produced the lowest 
joint benefit of all (when both parties share the 
same strategies) (pp. 176-178). 
However, in a negotiation situation a negotiator 
employs an accommodating (yielding) strategy for various 
reasons and various purposes. Yielding may be used to 
end negotiation quickly when issues are unimportant 
and time pressure is high: in other words, when there is 
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little at stake in conflict. But yielding is also used when 
there is a great deal at stake in conflict. For instance, 
a negotiator may use yielding on certain issues in order 
to induce corresponding concessions from the other side 
on other issues. In Pruitt's (1983) words, it is to 
"yield to a point that is compatible with the integra-
tive potential and then hold firm while engaging in 
flexible problem solving" (p. 171). In other words, a 
yielding or accommodating strategy is often used as an in-
tegral part of a collaborating strategy where one has a 
great deal at stake in conflict. The following section 
will discuss how cultural accommodation may occur as a 
function of collaboration. 
Positive Effects of Cultural Accommodation on Negotiating 
Power 
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The following is not a prescription of strategic nego-
tiating power. But what is to be discussed is that cul-
tural accommodation on the basis of astute preparation for 
and tremendous understanding of cultural differences can 
be, in fact, critical negotiating power rather than being 
simply viewed as yielding or subordinating. Of course, 
familiarity with cultural differences is a necessary but 
insufficient condition for the success of negotiation. 
Nevertheless, as stressed by Tung (1984),"unfamilia-
rity with cultural differences and inability to bridge the 
cultural gap can lead to the collapse of business nego-
tiation" (p. 76). Particularly such ignorance and in-
ability on the part of the one courting, who may nego-
tite from a position of less clout, can be a highly detri-
mental element to the outcomes of the cross-cultural 
business negotiation. 
Knowledge is power. Especially in cross-cultural 
negotiation where there is inherent uncertainty about 
each other's value system and preference of strategies 
and tactics, access to relevant information is critical. 
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Without knowledge relevant to a particular negotia-
tion, whether it is about "the people involved," "the 
interests involved," or/and "the facts involved," no 
negotiating power can be exercised effectively (Fisher, 
1983, p. 154). The power of skill and knowledge is a 
primary factor of Fisher's (1983) six kinds of negotiat-
ing power. Five other categories include: the power of a 
good relationship, the power of a good alternative to nego-
tiating, the power of an elegant solution, the power of 
legitimacy, and the power of commitment. Fisher (1983) 
claims that "exercising negotiating power effectively 
means orchestrating them in a way that maximizes their 
cumulative impact" (p. 152). 
Closely related to the power of skill and knowledge, 
Fisher's (1983) emphasis on the power of a good relation-
ship is also worth mentioning regarding cultural accommo-
dation. As seen in his and his colleague's (1983) method 
of "principled negotiation," Fisher's basic approach to 
conflict appears to be a synergistic creation of the third 
culture in that the method of principled negotiation is an 
alternative to (not merely a fusion of) traditional 
approaches to negotiating. It is a way neither hard nor 
soft but rather both hard and soft -- hard on the merits, 
soft on the people, which is designed to deal with a 
negotiator's interests both in substance and in a good 
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relationship without mingling them. 
The two most critical elements of a good working rela-
tionship are, Fisher ( 1983) says, first, "trust" and 
second, "the ability to communicate easily and effectively" 
(p. 155). Our power depends upon whether those on the 
other side can trust us rather than whether or not we can 
trust them; the ability of each to affect favorably the 
other's decision, namely, power, is enhanced by the abi-
lity to communicate, according to Fisher. The importance 
of establishing a supportive climate (Gibb, 1961) cannot 
be overemphasized; behavior characteristic of it includes 
description, problem orientation, spontaneity, empathy, 
equality, and provisionalism. Gibb's(1961) study re-
vealed a positive correlation between increases in de-
fensive behavior (evaluation, control, strategy, neutrality, 
superiority, and certainty) and losses in efficiency in 
communication. The more defensive the climate, the 
greater distortions. Conversely, as defenses are reduced, 
the receivers become better able to concentrate on the 
cognitive elements of the message rather than on the 
affect loading. 
The power of a good relationship which must be based 
on cultural understanding is easily found as a contributing 
factor to the success of both the aforementioned Mitsubishi-
Chrysler and Boeing-CTDC negotiations. In the former 
case the Chrysler negotiating team displayed their under-
standing of the importance of nurturing a relationship to 
the Japanese in a very empathic way. Kapoor (1975) notes 
that "one of the reasons for growing confidence in 
Chrysler by Mitsubishi was the cultivation of personal 
relations by both sides" (p. 120). As illustrated in 
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Table I on Summary of Japanese and American Business 
Negotiating Styles, the Japanese tend to devote considera-
ble time and expense to non-task sounding, the first stage 
of the negotiating process, to establish rapport or size up 
one another. Graham and Sano's (1984, p. 98) comment that 
"once the relationship has been established, substantial 
and complex negotiations will proceed more smoothly" is 
a widely held view on the Japanese negotiating style. 
An informal channel of communication was actively explored 
by both sides (Kapoor, 1975, p. 120). Chrysler opened 
offices at the Mitsubishi headquarters in Tokyo in May, 
1969 for the negotiation period (1968-1971). It made 
possible "gokigen-ukagai," or "dropping in to say·hello" 
by the Mitsubishi negotiating group from time to time at 
their discretion and was very useful whenever negotiations 
were at an impasse. For example, when a problem was caused 
by the difference in methods used by the Americans and the 
Japanese to forecast sales, the Japanese visitor would 
explain the Japanese method of forecasting to his Ameri-
can counterpart. Furthermore, during the negotiations 
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the Chrysler representatives gave a party for the Japanese 
members (including wives) of the negotiating team, which 
made an extremely good impression on the Japanese involved. 
This is a good example of the understanding of the impor-
tance of an informal channel of communication by Chrysler; 
it is said that in Japanese negotiation much is accomplished 
through such an informal channel of communication, including 
after-hour socializing, which is a common practice in Japan, 
rather than through a formal communication channel at the 
negotiation table. But perhaps more important was the 
flexibility displayed by Chrysler in seeking terms and 
Mitsubishi's favorable reaction to it (Kapoor, 1975, p. 120). 
On the other hand, in the joint program in aircraft 
production between Boeing and CTDC, where the Japanese 
were very accommodating and willing to follow the Ameri-
can way, a good relationship was cultivated in a differ-
ent fashion. It was true that Boeing was astute enough 
to establish good relations, by the courtesy call appro-
ach, with Japanese senior-ranking government officials 
who sponsored the negotiation. But equally true was that 
the U.S. partner indicated that "most of the decisions 
were made during office hours, which were 'very produc-
tive, effective, and cordial'" (Tung, 1984, p. 127). 
It must have increased Boeing's confidence in CTDC in 
this case, thereby helping enhance CTDC's negotiating 
position vis-a-vis its American partner. 
Cultural Synergy 
The dynamics of the negotiation situations in 
both cases may have been quite different from those 
of many other business negotiations. The Mitsubishi-
Chrysler joint-venture negotiations (1968-1971) took place 
within the context of growing pressures by Japan's major 
trading partners, particularly the United States, for 
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capital liberalization. The negotiations encompassed two 
critical issues: 1) how to gain approval from the Japanese 
government that was at that time supporting the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry's plan for reorganization 
of the Japanese automobile industry to better compete with 
larger foreign companies, and 2) how to neutralize the other 
Japanese automobile companies' negative attitudes toward the 
joint-venture with a foreign company. The unprecedented 
Mitsubishi-Chrysler joint-venture negotiation was under-
taken under extreme secrecy due to the delicacy of 
the situation. This forms a striking contrast to the 
context in which the negotiations between Boeing and 
CTDC occurred almost a decade later, when the Japanese 
government actively encouraged and even sponsored joint 
cooperation with foreign aircraft manufacturers. 
But what they had in common with any successful 
business negotiation is that in both cases there 
existed a considerable commonality of interests between 
the parties and a recognition of the mutual benefits of 
joint cooperation, therefore scope for mutual accommoda-
tion (even if one party was more accommodating than the 
other) toward collaborating endeavors and a positive 
commitment toward the negotiation on the part of both 
sides. In the Mitsubishi-Chrysler case, the commonality 
of interests and the mutual benefits were identified as 
follows: 
On the Mitsubishi side: 
1. Chrysler was one of the most influentual firms 
in the world, and it had an excellent reputa-
tion for management skills as well as techno-
logical know-how based upon long experience 
in the auto industry. 
2. Mitsubishi and Chysler might be able to com-
pensate for each other's weaknesses by sharing 
their worldwide production. For example, 
Mitsubishi had the advantage of its truck pro-
duction and Chrysler its passenger car pro-
duction. 
3. Chrysler appeared to seek more reasonable terms 
compared to Ford and GM. GM insisted on 100 
percent ownership of its subsidiaries, Ford 
wanted a 50-50 ownership arrangement, and only 
Chrysler would accept between 20-30 percent 
ownership. 
4. Mitsubishi was weak in the area of an interna-
tional marketing network, which could be pro-
vided by Chrysler. 
5. Chrysler simply could not take over the joint 
venture as it had done in France and Spain. 
Since the Mitsubishi Group would hold all the 
shares allotted to Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 
(MHI) in the joint venture company, none of its 
shares would be available on the market. 
Chrysler would not be able to buy a share of 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, nor could it buy 
any shares of the joint venture company that 
belonged to MHI unless, of course, MHI decided 
to sell -- an unlikely occurrence at best. 
In case Chrysler wanted to obtain any control 
of MHI' share of the joint venture company's 
stock, it would eventually have to go through 
Mitsubishi Group, which was powerful enough to 
defeat any financial ploys that Chrysler might 
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attempt. Considering these circumstances, the 
possibility of a takeover bid by Chrysler, 
feared by the Japanese government, would be 
practically impossible in the Mitsubishi-
Chrysler case. (Kapoor, 1975, pp. 113-114) 
Chrysler was attracted to Mitsubishi for four key 
reasons: 
1 . Japan was the only market that had not been 
previously invaded by GM and Ford. Chrysler 
wanted to be the first in that market. 
2. Mitsubishi is one of the leading heavy in-
dustry companies in many fields. Thus it 
would be beneficial for Chrysler to tie up 
up with Mitsubishi in case it wanted to enter 
into any other heavy industry fields beside 
that of the auto industry. 
3. Chrysler would be able to compensate for some 
of its weaknesses - for example, in truck pro-
duction, one of Mitsubishi's strong areas. 
4. Chrysler wanted to obtain a share of the small 
car market by importing Mitsubishi cars to 
the U.S. (Kapoor, 1975, p. 114) 
In the Boeing CDTD negotiations motives to cooperate on 
each side were: 
The Japanese government identified aircraft, both 
military and commercial, as a potential growth in-
dustry because: 
1. The aerospace industry is high-technology, 
export-oriented, and hence worthwhile from 
the standard of Japanese objectives. 
2. For some time the U.S. government has prodded 
the Japanese to assume greater responsibility 
for its own defense. 
3. The production of commercial aircraft repre-
sents a viable route for recouping or re-
covering the costs of research and develop-
ment on military defense. (Tung, 1984, p. 115) 
Boeing's motivations to embark on a joint program 
with CTDC were: 
1. Risk-sharing: Because of the unique character-
istics of the aircraft industry, there are tre-
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mendous risks involved in developing a new air-
plane. By allowing participation by others, 
Boeing would share that risk. In a typical 
program about the half the costs of production 
are borne by subcontractors and suppliers. 
2. Market access: The aircraft is highly competi-
tive; although participation by a country does 
not necessarily guarantee the purchase of air-
craft by a government-owned airline, it does 
create a more favorable market environment. 
3. By involving Japanese firms, it 'keeps these 
companies (and countries) out of a competi-
tive alignment.' Besides this joint pro-
gram with Boeing on the 767s and more re-
cently agreed on YXX series, Japan has also 
entered into an agreement with other U.S. and 
European firms to form a seven-firm consortium 
for the construction of a jet engine for use 
in a new 150-passenger airplane .... (Tung, 
1984, p. 116) 
In this Boeing-CTDC case it should be also noted that re-
ciprocal cultural awareness on the part of the Americans 
played an important role for the success (Tung, 1984, p. 
123, pp. 126-127). Mutual (cultural) accommodation was a 
distinctive characteristic of the Mitsubishi-Chrysler 
negotiation too, as described earlier. 
In this respect, it appears that as Moran and Harris 
(1982) say, "cultural synergy exists only in relation to 
a practical set of circumstances and it takes place by 
necessity when two or possibly more culturally different 
groups come to the mutual conclusion that they need to 
unite their efforts in order to achieve their respective 
goals" (p. 5). Conversely, it can be said that a strong 
underlying commitment toward mutual cooperation on the 
part of both sides can make formidable cultural barriers 
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surmountable (at least at the practical level). 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The main purpose of this chapter was to examine some 
of the factors that affect motivation to use an inter-
cultural communication perspective in cross-cultural 
business negotiation. We discussed two sources of in-
fluence upon parties' cultural adaptability: motives to 
cooperate and power relations. 
The review of the relevant literature on U.S.-Japan 
business negotiation case studies showed that strong 
enough motivation on the part of both sides leads to 
reciprocal cultural accommodation. It was suggested that 
successful cross-cultural negotiation contains an aspect 
of cultural synergy through such mutual cultural accommo-
dation. 
In the following final chapter we will further discuss 
the importance of cultural awareness and adaptation for the 




The term "difference" has been continually emphasized 
throughout this paper. The assumption of cultural differ-
ence is at the core of learning intercultural communica-
tion and dealing with difference is the major skill de-
manded. In other words, as seen in communication of any 
kind, often it is not difference that breaks up communi-
cation -- it is the failure to deal with it. A part of 
the difficulty of dealing with difference lies in the 
fact that the ability to accept and appreciate difference 
demands personal maturity. It includes inner security, 
high self-esteem, and integrity as well as psychological 
and cognitive flexibility, all of which permit us to 
understand the underlying reasons causing differences and 
to deal with them objectively. 
This study was intended to help develop a balanced 
view of cultural difference for the improvement of cross-
cultural negotiating skills from the following angles. 
Chapters II and III discussed the major differences 
in the process of business negotiation between the United 
States and Japan and potential friction between Americans 
and Japanese in business negotiation arising from cul-
tural differences. Specifically Chapter III examined 
cultural differences in the light of 1) assumptions 
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and values, 2) philosophies of negotiating, 3) communi-
cation styles, 4) decision-making processes, and 5) 
situational constraints and status relationships. However, 
it should be noted that this study did not attempt to pre-
determine negotiating behaviors of the two cultural groups. 
As mentioned everywhere in this paper, negotiating behavior 
is influenced by various factors such as environmental 
conditions, (i.e., political, economic, social, and cul-
tural contexts in which negotiators operate), as well as 
such factors as issues, events, expertise, and person-
alities. Cultural generalizations and comparisons were 
made for the purpose of overcoming our natural cultural 
blindness; in other words, to provide some insights into 
unconscious factors (i.e., cultural factors) and the de-
gree to which such unconscious factors condition nego-
tiating behavior. 
Chapter IV was devoted to the concepts of intercul-
tural communication principles and the applicability and 
usefulness of an intercultural perspective in enhancing 
negotiating skills. It was hoped that the concepts of 
intercultural communication would provide a theoretical 
framework to see culture-biased communication problems in 
perspective. But more importantly, the underlying in-
terest of this study lay in the hope that with the con-
ception of culture as subjective culture, i.e., an in-
dividual's cognitive and perceptual processes, the appli-
cability and usefulness of intercultural perspective 
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could be expanded into other spheres of human interaction. 
The perspective is based on appreciation of uniqueness of 
each individual's values and perceptions, which naturally 
leads to an assumption of value and perceptual differences 
between cultures. A culture may be himself/herself, male/ 
female, parent/child, management/labor, American diplomat/ 
Soviet diplomat, and so on. The larger notion of "culture" 
is simply a composite view of the consistencies among 
groups of individual subjective cultures. 
Chapter V focused attention on the impact of situa-
tional constraints upon negotiating behavior in terms of 
cultural adaptability. A party's behavior was seen as a 
result of and a response to a variety of structural 
variables surrounding the negotiation process. Structural 
variables, according to Thomas' (1976) structural model, 
include 1) parties' behavioral predispositions which stem 
partially from motives and abilities, 2) social pressure 
(e.g., constituent pressure, ambient social pressure), 
3) incentive structure -- the conflict of interest between 
parties and their stakes in the relationship, and 4) rules 
and procedures (pp. 912-926). We were, however, concerned 
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with two sources of influence upon the behavior of the 
parties: motives and power relations between parties that 
affect "stakes" in the relationship. A review of literature 
on U.S. - Japan business negotiation case studies suggested 
that a party's motives and his power relations with the 
other party tend to influence the degree of his cultural 
adaptation (the greater a party's motives and stakes are 
in conflict, the more culturally accommodating a party 
becomes), thereby minimize the effect of a party's ori-
ginal behavioral orientation, including his culturally 
predisposed behavior and his personal idiosyncracies. 
However, this finding is twofold. On the one hand, 
it suggests that cultural values and norms as ambient 
social pressure (one structural variable) are constrained 
and outweighed by another structural variable -- incentives. 
But on the other hand, a party's cultural sensitivity is 
in fact encouraged and promoted by incentives into acting 
out culturally accommodating behavior toward the other 
party. In other words, even though the influence of a 
party's original cultural values and norms on his be-
havior is (or should be) minimized under certain con-
ditions, it is not undermined, rather objectified and 
modified with practical and functional purposes. This is 
called cultural adaptation. In this respect, the main 
point of the discussion on "the reality of living with 
Western domination" was in an attempt to see the impact 
of structurally shaped power relations between parties 
on their cultural adaptability in a more general and 
broader context. 
The effectiveness of cultural adaptation on the out-
comes of cross-cultural negotiation was also an important 
point to be made in Chapter V in term of cultural accommo-
dation as negotiating power (strategic power) in contrast 
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to structurally shaped negotiation power. It was argued 
that it is possible for a party in a position of less power 
to utilize cultural awareness and accommodation as negotiat-
ing power, thus somehow dilute (if not turn around in the 
long run) the effect of the existing power relations with 
the other party. However, the reality is that a party who 
has far more negotiating edge over the other can get by 
without adeQuate cultural accommodation, whereas a party 
in a weaker position cannot afford to ignore cultural 
differences in order to attain successful outcomes. 
Kobrin's (1984) research on the nature and importance 
of international expertise in large American internation-
al firms provides some supporting evidence on this connec-
tion between power and cultural accommodation: "··· expa-
triate managers who are successful without learning the 
language are almost always in firms with very strong competi-
tive or product positions" although language competency 
has remained a controversial topic in international 
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business and "there are few places that one cannot 'get by' 
with English." (p. 30, p. 36). 
Yet no doubt the optimal joint benefit is produced 
by collaborating endeavors on the part of both sides, which 
include mutual cultural awareness and accommodation. With 
this implication the term accommodating was qualified as an 
integral part of collaborating efforts, as opposed to its 
insulated definition as a strategy resulting from one's 
relatively little stakes in a relationship where there is 
commonality of interest. According to this formal defini-
tion of accommodating, mutual accommodation leads to the 
lowest joint benefit among all: collaborating, contending, 
and accommodating when the same strategy is shared by both 
parties (e.g., Pruitt, 1983). Regarding this point, the two 
successful U.S.-Japan business negotiation case studies 
exemplified 1) the occurrence of cultural accommodation as 
a result of a party's great stakes in a relationship in 
which there is considerable commonality of interest, which 
is considered as a condition of collaboration, and 2) an 
emergence of cultural synergy through reciprocal cultural 
accommodation as a result of strong commitment to colla-
boration on the part of both sides. 
THE FUTURE OF CULTURAL AWARENESS IN BUSINESS AND NEGOTIATION 
The following discussion is based on the Kobrin (1984) 
study titled International Expertise in American Business, 
the data of which were gathered through interviews and a 
mailed survey from a total of 233 managers in 126 large, 
international, American firms ("Fortune 500" industrial 
firms), which are statistically representative of the 217 
firms included in the study. While the study is about 
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the U.S. managerial perceptions of international expertise, 
it offers valuable insight into the importance of cultural 
sensitivity and cultural learning for the business leaders 
of the future, or anyone who is involved in international 
business. 
Thus, a review of the study is expected not only to 
lend support to the efforts of this thesis to demonstrate 
the importance of cultural learning but also to validate 
and elaborate on the discussion of cultural adaptability 
in the previous chapter from a more realistic point of 
view. Two issues will be explored: 1) the importance of 
international expertise and 2) cultural training impli-
cations. 
The Importance of International Expertise 
Kobrin (1984) observes U.S. managerial perceptions of 
international expertise as follows: 
- Managers view international expertise from an in-
formation and an operating perspective. Economic, 
social, and political information is necessary 
for the analysis and forecasting underlying plan-
ning and decision making. An understanding of 
how to interact with people and organizations in 
other countries, of how to "move around and get it 
done," is req_uired to operate outside of the United 
States •••• 
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International expertise also can be country speci-
fic or general .... No one discounts the value of in-
formation and specific country knowledge; indeed 
it is impossible to do business abroad without 
them. Yet most of the managers I spoke to are more 
concerned with operating and comparative expertise .... 
they sought a general understanding of how to work 
outside of the United States; sensitivity rather than 
information or expertise .... An international trea-
surer claimed he does not need to be the world's 
leading Philippine expert. Rather, he feels it 
critical to understand differences in ways of 
approaching a problem and getting things done •..• 
- The distinction between specific country knowledge 
and comparative international expertise starts with 
premise that an international manager cannot expect 
to develop in-depth expertise about all of the 
countries with which he or she must deal. What may 
be more important is recognizing that other countries 
are different, learning exactly what it is that is 
likely to vary, and gaining an appreciation of the 
range that variation can encompass. An international 
personnel manager stated the idea directly: "The most 
important thing is to know that there are a hell of 
a lot of differences between countries." Many of 
my respondents expressed frustration with their 
domestic colleagues who simply could not be con-
vinced that business is done differently in other 
places •••• 
- International expertise entails the ability to 
generalize and compare. Many managers, for exam-
ple, observed that there is a considerable differ-
ence in how directly one can approach a problem 
or a negotiation across cultures. Those who 
realize that this difference exists, and that 
Americans are more direct than most, have a clear 
advantage even if they are not sure how negotia-
tions are handled in a specific country. A 
senior executive in a computer firm told me about 
negotiations in progress with China. He said that 
he knew very little about that country when he 
started, but he had considerable experience in 
dealing with other centralized governments and, 
despite the differences, it was q_uite helpful. 
Just knowing the forms that political and cul-
tural differences make, or even that differences 
exist, is a plus. (pp. 9-13) 
Regarding the importance of the assumptions of 
difference a similar view point is expressed by writers 
on Peace Corps' experience. When Peace Corps' volunteers 
psychologically prepared for vast differences between 
cultural customs, norms, and values, they generally 
faced less communicative and cultural conflict than those 
going to apparently similar but actually dissimilar soci-
eties (Prosser, 1978, p. 20). However, again, throughout 
his research Kobrin (1984) observed that one of the prob-
lems of U.S. international managers is "convincing their 
colleagues that other countries are different; that people 
see things, do things, and approach problems in a variety 
of ways" (p. 61). Kobrin attributes this in part to cir-
cumstantial isolation, that is, to the fact that Americans 
live on a large and relatively homogeneous continent. 
148 
In Bennett's (1984) model this describes the "isolation" 
stage of the state of "denial," the most naive and paro-
chial position of ethnocentrism. From a position of 
"isolation," due to the lack of a category for cultural 
difference, "cultural difference is not experienced at all. 
It simply has no meaning" (Bennett, 1984, p. 1 0. Ref er to 
the summary of the model in Chapter IV). But it also seems 
that those who cannot be convinced that "American policies, 
procedures, and management techniques must be adapted, 
or might even be inapplicable, in other contexts" could 
be in a position of "superiority," one form of "defense," 
or in a state of "minimization," using Bennett's termino-
logy. Both the "defense" and "minimization" states 
"overtly acknowledge" cultural difference and yet the 
former perceives 'it as "threatening" and the latter 
"trivializes" it. 
At this point of time, there is no data available 
about Japanese managerial perceptions of international 
expertise comparable to the one of the Kobrin study. 
However, it could be assumed that Japanese managers would 
not have as much trouble as their American counterparts 
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in convincing their colleagues that other countries are 
different. Rather, Japanese in general are so conscious 
and so overly cautious of cultural difference that they 
tend to imprison themselves in their own paranoiac ethno-
centric frame, as discussed in Chapter IV. This may take 
the form of "rejection" (the intentional erection of 
physical or social barriers to create distance) in the 
"denial" state, or could eventuate in the position of 
"reversal" (a denigration of one's own culture and an 
attendant assumption of superiority of a different cul-
ture) in the "defense" state in Bennett's model. On a 
personal level many Japanese might follow these patterns. 
Yet on a business level, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, many Japanese businessmen overseas appear to be 
fairly adaptive to cultural differences. A good example of 
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this ambivalance of the Japanese behavior overseas can be 
found in a magazine article about the Bridgestone's 
successful takeover of the Firestone plant in La Vergne, 
Tenn. Bridgestone, Japan's No. 1 tiremaker, turned the old 
tire factory around and pumped new life into the local 
economy. Management-labor relations have improved 
significantly. "Morale is at least 300% better than it was 
under Firestone," says La Vergne City Manager Richard 
Anderson. Nonetheless in a social context there has been 
little interaction between the Japanese and Americans. "The 
Japanese are pretty closed as a group .... They pretty much 
keep to themselves," Anderson also comments. (Time, 
September 14, 1987, p. 60). 
Back to Kobrin's (1984) report, survey results were con-
sistent with the aforementioned interviews regarding the 
managers' perceptions of specific country knowledge vs. 
comparative international expertise. When respondents 
were asked to rank six factors in order of their im-
portance to effective international management, the ability 
to deal with people was ranked first by 49% of the re-
spondents, whereas country knowledge was much further down 
the list ranked fifth by only 11%. Other factors are: 
functional knowledge (i.e., marketing or finance) second 
by 32%; company knowledge third, 26%; knowledge of in-
dustry and competitors fourth, 21% and technical know-
ledge last, 10% (p. 12). However, it seems safe to see 
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the survey results only in the relative importance of 
operational and comparative international expertise 
against country knowledge in this case, for if people 
skills in the survey represent operational and com-
parative international expertise, the following inter-
view results do not appear to be congruent with the above 
survey. The question still remains: how really important 
is international expertise relative to all of the other 
skills such as functional skills, technical and product 
knowledge, corporate expertise and the like? Kobrin 
(1984) points out that while the majority of the respon-
dents interviewed agree that international expertise has 
some value, they disagree about its importance. 
A small minority (10%) of those interviewed feel 
international expertise is the critical factor in 
international business. They believe it to be more 
important than technical or functional skills or 
even company experience, and state that it is a 
major factor in hiring people for international 
jobs and in promotion decisions. A much larger 
number (45%) feel international expertise is 
important, but not critical. While technical 
and functional skills clearly come first, inter-
national expertise is a very important plus. 
it helps get the job done or it may even be 
necessary; however, it is not sufficient. 
Another substantial group (37%) characterized 
international expertise as "nice to have" but 
relatively minor factor in international business. 
They feel that they can obtain what is necessary 
when the need arises. Last, a very small minority 
(6%) discount the importance of this sort of 
expertise almost entirely or even feel it can be 
a negative influence, providing reasons for people 
not to do their jobs. While the four groups of 
managers disagree about the relative importance 
of international expertise, they all agree that it 
alone is not sufficient. Basic business skills are 
an absolute requirement.(pp. 18-19) 
Again how important is international expertise? 
First of all, no one suggested that international exper-
tise can, and will substitute for basic business abili-
ties and skills, not to mention "'horror stories' about 
individuals who were accomplished linguists or country 
experts but simply could not function in a business en-
vironment" (p. 17). And perhaps more importantly, as a 
manager who exports heavy equipment to Latin America and 
who is a Peace Corps alumnus points out, while inter-
national expertise is vital, "one needs stronger business 
and technical ability overseas than at home," and the 
bottom line is that "international expertise is of value 
only when converted to business results'' (p. 22). 
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However, it is difficult to measure precisely how much 
international expertise contributes to effective perfor-
mance overseas because the importance or effectiveness of 
international expertise depends largely upon individuals' 
perceptions of it. Referring to the extreme range of 
opinion within companies, Kobrin (1984) maintains that 
differences in assessment of the importance of interna-
tional expertise reflect "individual background and ex-
perience, particularly substantial business (or in a few 
cases non-business) experience abroad" (p. 26). Several 
people interviewed made an interesting and related point 
suggesting that "perceptions of the importance of inter-
national expertise may reflect how much international 
expertise one has. Those without it have difficulty 
in seeing its value; they really do not know what they 
are missing" (p. 26). Specifically, Kobrin (1984) ex-
plains. 
All nine of the managers I interviewed who said 
international expertise is critical had served 
abroad themselves. Only one of the six who dis-
counted its value had done so. Fifty-four per-
cent of those who had previous overseas assign-
ment feel it is important compared to 31% of those 
who had not, while only 31% of those who had been 
abroad characterize international expertise as un-
important compared to 52% of those who had not. 
(The differences are not statistically signifi-
cant at conventional levels.) Survey results 
support this observation. Managers who have been 
assigned abroad are less likely to disagree, and 
more likely to agree, that international expertise 
affects promotion decisions. (p. 25) 
In summary, Kobrin (1984) raised three important 
points about managerial perceptions of international 
expertise as follows; 
1) Perceptions are derived from experience - the value 
of international expertise may not be apparent to 
those who do not have it; 
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2) There is a tendency to consider "the ability to do 
the job" and international expertise to be indepen-
dent of one another, to define the former in terms 
of business skills alone. That separation of the 
task from its context may not be warranted; 
3) There is a tendency to see adaptability as a result of 
basic personality traits; the implication is that in-
ternational managers are born not made. Adaptability, 
however, may well be learned; it may come with an 
appreciation of individual and national differences. 
It may result from developing international expertise. 
(pp. 28-29) 
The third point was made based on the ~uite interesting 
fact that a number of managers who do not value inter-
national expertise highly speak well of the value of 
adaptability in international business nonetheless, but 
in terms of basic personality traits (p. 27). By adapta-
bility they mean such traits as flexibility, openness, 
and sensitivity to others. They argue that "what is 
important internationally is not so much knowledge of 
differences, but the ability to adapt to them" (p. 27). 
In other words, they do not seem to consider adaptabi-
lity as an essential part of international expertise. 
But in fact, they are arguing the relative importance 
of two major elements of international expertise. "Know-
ledge of differences" appears to represent specific 
country knowledge and "the ability to adapt to them" 
operative and comparative international expertise. Adapt-
ability may have a lot to do with personality. But in 
the author's opinion it is also a learned quality through 
an interplay of pragmatic purposes and intellect. And 
adaptability certainly includes a willingness to learn 
differences. 
While virtually everyone agrees that excellence 
in basic business abilities and adaptability are the 
critical factors in international business, there is a 
considerably wider range of opinion about the edge 
that international expertise provides. But again, can we 
really afford to discount international expertise? Kobrin 
(1984) comments on this question and it seems to help 
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reinforce the importance of cultural adaptability in inter-
national business discussed in the previous chapter. 
There has been a great deal of discussion about 
restoring American competitiveness abroad in re-
cent years. While the problem is complex, and 
would entail a thorough analysis that is beyond 
the scope of this report, in many industries 
the U.S. technological advantage has narrowed, 
or even been eliminated. As never before, we 
face competition from Europe, Japan, and even 
many of the more advanced developing countries. 
While managers may be able to get by with minimal 
international expertise, they may not be com-
titive internationally if European and Japanese 
firms do a better job of adaptation and inter-
action. I suspect that as the technological gap 
narrows, that will apply to language also. While 
many people abroad can deal in English, many 
would rather not. Furthermore, the market and 
political-economic information gained as a result 
of language competency may provide an important 
competitive advantage (p. 63). 
Cultural Training Implications 
As discussed in the previous section, sensitivity 
to cultural differences has a great deal to do with both 
the quality and the quantity of one's intercultural ex-
perience. As Kobrin (1984) says, "many whose interna-
tional exposure is limited understate both the differ-
ences and similarities between the world at large and 
their own country" (p. 61). It is largely because of 
one's lack of categories and of psychological mechanisms 
for dealing with a wide variety of stimuli. In the 
Bennett (1984) model this is characteristic of the "iso-
lation" stage of "denial," as discussed earlier. In this 
stage the lack of a category for cultural difference is 
due to circumstantial physical isolation, i.e., "limited 
international exposure." 
In Kobrin's (1984) study managers in general acquired 
country knowledge and international expertise through 
experience, through business travel and assignment abroad. 
However, the study revealed that opportunities for expa-
triate assignments have been reduced significantly for 
the past decade due largely to the effectiveness of local 
nationals operating in their own environment. Conse-
quently many Americans can no longer have an option to 
develop international expertise through extensive ex-
perience abroad. And yet the study also shows a dramatic 
increase in international involvement of those firms in 
the same period (see the survey results in Table VIII). 
International involvement includes travel and other inter-
national responsibilities and cross-cultural interactions 
which now become a part of "domestic" jobs. For instance, 
"plant managers in Michigan find that they need to co-
ordinate producion with their counterparts in Munich and 
Mexico City and purchase materials from Korea or Taiwan. 
Product development people and product managers who have 
not been, and probably will not be, assigned abroad rou-
tinely coordinate their activities globally" (p. 51 ). 
As Table VIII shows, fifty percent of the firms surveyed 
said the number of American expatriates abroad had de-
creased over the last ten years, 26% said it stayed the 
156 
same and only 23% reported an increase. On the other 
hand, sixty-seven percent of those firms reported an in-
crease in the number of Americans involved internation-
ally during the past decade, whereas only 14% of the firms 
noted a decrease in the same time period and 18% claimed 
TABLE VIII 
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF MANAGERS 
% % % 
Decreased Same Increased 
Past 10 years: 
Expatriates 
abroad 50.0 26. 1 22.7 
Americans 
Involved 
Internationally 13.6 18.2 67.0 
In the Future: 
Expatriates 
abroad 40.9 39.8 18.2 
Americans 
Involved 
Internationall 17.0 25.0 56.8 
Source: Kobrin, 1984, P· 52. 
no change. The interview results are consistent with the 
survey. Seventy-three percent noted a reduction in use of 
expatriates, while only 8% claimed an increase; never-
theless, most reported a marked expansion of international 
involvement (Kobrin, 1984, p. 52). 
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Furthermore, these two opposing trends are projected 
to continue: a further reduction in expatriates and a 
continual increase in international involvement as domestic 
positions become more and more internationalized. In other 
words, "just as the demand for international expertise 
appears to be on the verge of increasing significantly, 
its traditional source is drying up" (Kobrin, 1984, p. 
55). If that is the case, how do the next generation of 
U.S. international managers develop their perceptions of 
the importance of cultural sensitivity and international 
expertise in the absense of extensive experience abroad? 
Two things have to be kept in mind. First, "only a very 
small proportion of the managers (Kobrin spoke with) were 
committed internationalists to begin with. A great many 
developed their interest in, and commited to, internation-
al management as a result of assignments abroad." 
Second, "it is not only the expertise itself that has come 
from assignments abroad, but the development of individual 
perceptions of its importance, of the value of language 
and of adaptability" (Kobrin, 1984, p. 64). It seems 
that all of this suggests the importance of raising an 
awareness of cultural learning that not only sensitizes 
one to cultural differences but provides a framework 
that helps understand the differences systematically. 
(This paper itself is intended to be a process of cultural 
learning). In Kobrin's (1984) study it was mentioned re-
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peatedly that most of the managers are more concerned with 
the ability to establish "ground rules" quickly when 
visiting other countries, i.e., operating and comparative 
expertise, rather than with in-depth knowledge of condi-
tions in specific countries. The author believes that 
Chapter III provided an example of how such ground rules 
can be developed through organizing major differences and 
similarities between cultures in such categories as cul-
tural assumptions and values (basic conceptualizations of 
the self, family, society, and the universe), communica-
tion styles (verbal and nonverbal processes, including 
such concepts as time and space), decision-making proces-
ses, and so forth. The ability to conceptualize and cate-
gorize cultural patterns can be a basis of identifying 
similarities and differences in political and economic 
systems between countries. In fact, political and econo-
mic systems cannot be fully comprehended without taking 
into account the cultural context of which they are parts. 
As summed up well by Hoopes (1979), "the multicultural 
person is the person who has learned how to learn culture" 
(p. 21). Culture can be, and needs to be learned syste-
matically without depending upon the "sink or swim" 
approach in the past. In reality the costs associated 
with such a conventional approach may no longer be tolera-
ble for many firms. While no amount of cultural training 
may be able to help escape one's feelings of frustration 
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or discomfort in the face of the clash of conflicting 
cultural patterns, at least being psychologically pre-
pared for that occurrence can make one more tolerant of 
and capable of dealing with difficulties when they arise. 
Cultural learning and training can assist in such con-
scious efforts toward the integration of a three-dimen-
s ional i.e., cognitive, affective, and behavioral learn-
ing process. Prospective business leaders should start 
developing their cultural awareness as early as possible 
in their school years, through foreign language training 
programs, through foreign student exchange programs, 
through Peace Corps assignments and so on. Resources are 
available and the magnitude of the experience is beyond 
one's imagination. 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
First of all, one of the major limitations and short-
comings of this study should be noted. Perceptions and 
experience of negotiators reported in this study were mostly 
those of one side of the negotiation table. By the same 
token, the relevant negotiation theories were all derived 
from the Western literature. This might undermine the 
persuasiveness of this study. Other studies could incor-
porate the following: 1) a review of the relevant literature 
written by the Japanese on the Japanese approach to nego-
tiation, to conflict and conflict management; and 2) re-
1 6 1 
search on the Japanese managerial perceptions and experi-
ence of negotiation and international expertise. 
Other possible suggestions would be: 1) a controlled 
study on U.S.-Japan business negotiation involving those 
with much intercultural experience and those with limited 
intercultural exposure, all else equal, to explore the 
effectiveness and the edge that cultural sensitivity can 
provide to cross-cultural negotiation skills; and 2) in 
terms of the selection of effective expatriates abroad, 
a comparative study on managers who have high inter-
cul tural sensitivity with limited international business 
experience versus managers who have enough international 
business experience and yet may lack intercultural sen-
sitivity. 
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